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ARTICLE 
CODIFYING CUSTOM 
TIMOTHY MEYER† 
Codifying decentralized forms of law, such as the common law and custom-
ary international law, has been a cornerstone of the positivist turn in legal theory 
since at least the nineteenth century. Commentators laud codification’s purport-
ed virtues, including systematizing, centralizing, and clarifying the law.  These 
attributes are thought to increase the general welfare of those subject to legal 
rules and therefore to justify and explain codification.  The literature, however, 
overlooks codification’s distributive consequences.  In so doing, it misses a com-
mon motive for codification:  to define legal rules in a way that advantages in-
dividual codifying institutions, regardless of how it affects the general welfare.  
This Article fills the gap in the literature by examining three rationales for 
why states codify customary international law:  (1) a desire to clarify the sub-
stantive content of customary law in order to promote cooperation (the Clarifica-
tion Thesis); (2) a desire to enhance compliance through mechanisms such as 
monitoring, enforcement, and dispute-resolution provisions (the Compliance 
Thesis); and (3) a desire to define the content of customary rules for a state’s 
individual benefit (the Capture Thesis).  While codification’s proponents con-
ceive of the enterprise in terms of the Clarification and Compliance Theses, I 
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sica Stanton, Logan Sawyer, Christian Turner, David Zaring, and participants at faculty 
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argue that states frequently use codification to capture customary international 
legal rules to benefit themselves at the expense of the general welfare.  As states 
with divergent views on how to interpret a customary rule pursue conflicting 
codification efforts, they entrench schisms in the law along regional or ideologi-
cal lines, thereby delegitimizing customary rules and increasing fragmentation.  
Thus, far from being an unqualified boon to benevolent legal ordering, codifica-
tion can replicate, magnify, or alter the power dynamics present in forming bare 
customary law.  Indeed, the fragmentation of customary law that can result 
from codification actually prevents a unified understanding of customary law 
from emerging—the exact opposite of codification’s ostensible purpose.  This 
Article uses the Capture Thesis to explain important developments in customary 
international law, including the outlawing of the slave trade in the nineteenth 
century, the rise of bilateral investment treaties, and the inability to reach an 
agreement on a multilateral investment treaty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the World Trade Organization (WTO) abandoned its 
most recent effort to reach a multilateral agreement governing in-
vestment.1  Such efforts have been part of an on-again, off-again push 
by developed countries to codify and harmonize international invest-
ment law, with the goal of reducing barriers to international capital 
flows and facilitating regional integration in places like North America 
and Europe.  Developed states have pushed for a multilateral agree-
ment since the end of World War II and indeed produced draft con-
ventions in 1948, 1967, and 1998.2  But none of these draft conventions 
has gained traction.  With efforts at the WTO unsuccessful, trade in 
capital remains the key pillar of international economic law still largely 
outside the purview of WTO disciplines.  International investment law 
thus remains governed by customary international law and the “spa-
ghetti bowl” of bilateral, regional, and sectoral agreements that partial-
ly codify investment law.   
This pattern of failure is puzzling.  States long ago agreed to a ro-
bust set of multilateral rules governing trade in goods and services.  
They reached these agreements despite a relative lack of preexisting 
multilateral law on trade liberalization and protection, at least when 
compared with investment law.  Prior to the 1947 General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),3 for example, there was little multilat-
eral law in the area of trade barriers; prior to the 1994 General 
Agreement on Trade in Services,4 there was little independent law on 
trade in services.  
 
1 JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BILATERIAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 43 
(2011). 
2 See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW 31-60 (2009) (discussing post–World War II efforts to negotiate a multilateral 
investment regime).   
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 184. 
4 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183. 
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Prospective codifiers of investment law, by contrast, have a wealth 
of sources on which to draw for their multilateral codification efforts.  
For at least a century, customary international investment law has pro-
vided a multilateral legal standard governing the protection of proper-
ty owned by aliens.5  Moreover, the explosion of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and similar regional and sectoral investment agree-
ments—the structure and content of which are similar across the 
roughly 2600 agreements in force—have reinforced preexisting cus-
tomary law and created a type of multilateral regime that reaches most 
states in the world.6  Yet as the many efforts to negotiate a viable multi-
lateral investment agreement at both the WTO and the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) attest, states do 
not view this patchwork of treaties with limited membership and cus-
tomary law as an adequate substitute for a truly multilateral convention.   
What, then, explains the failure to reach a multilateral agreement 
on investment?  I argue that this failure is part of a larger phenome-
non in which codification—by which I mean the process of reducing 
law to a written instrument that elaborates established customary doc-
trines—can actually interfere with the development of truly global gov-
ernance.  Specifically, I contend that states often use codification to 
capture customary international legal rules to benefit themselves at 
the expense of the general welfare of the global community.   
This suggestion may seem radical:  the codification of customary 
international law—along with the rise of international organizations, 
one of the pillars of the twentieth century movement toward legaliza-
tion in international affairs—has been a part of the legalization project 
since the late nineteenth century.7  Spurred by the rise of legal positiv-
 
5 See, e.g., Neer v. Mexico, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-62 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1926) 
(holding that a foreign government’s treatment of an alien “should amount to an out-
rage” in order to hold the government liable).  
6 See SCHILL, supra note 2, at 40-41 (chronicling the rise of, and subsequent chang-
es to, bilateral and regional investment agreements); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment 
Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 125-28 (2003) (dis-
cussing developing countries’ increased use of BITs in recent years to attract capital 
from multinational companies).  
7 For the jurisprudential origins of the codification movement, see “LEGISLATOR OF 
THE WORLD”:  WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW, AND EDUCATION (Philip Schofield & 
Jonathan Harris eds., 1998), which collects the letters and writings of Jeremy Bentham, 
the originator of codification.  See also G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT § 211, at 241 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (stressing the need 
to codify custom as law in order to prevent the confusion and indeterminacy of com-
mon law systems).  Bentham is credited with coining the term “codification” and arguing 
that it would promote clarity in the law.  See Judith Resnick, Bring Back Bentham:  “Open 
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ism and a desire to avoid the pan-European and global conflicts that 
marred the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states convened 
major codification conferences in 1899, 1907, and 1930.8  After World 
War II, the U.N. Charter explicitly tasked the General Assembly with 
the development and codification of international law as a means of 
promoting international cooperation,9 a job the General Assembly has 
largely delegated to the International Law Commission (ILC).  More-
over, codification continues to occupy a central place in contemporary 
international legal practice.  Since 1990, states have codified or have 
tried to codify customary rules of investment law in negotiations at the 
WTO and OECD,10 international criminal law in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court,11 and customary norms of environ-
mental protection in a variety of regional and global agreements.12  
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted customary law on 
the use of force and its exceptions, as codified in the U.N. Charter.  
Furthermore, the treatment of detainees in the war on terror has 
brought to the fore the customary international law on the treatment of 
prisoners, as codified in the Geneva Conventions,13 and the ban on tor-
ture, as codified in the Convention Against Torture (CAT).14 
 
Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 19-20 (2011); see 
also infra note 27. 
8 ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165-66 
(2007). 
9 U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1.  
10 The OECD’s failed attempt to pass the Multilateral Investment Agreement is a 
prominent example.  Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment:  Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 
1998) [hereinafter Draft MAI], available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ 
ng987r1e.pdf.  The Draft MAI will be discussed below as an example of how codifica-
tion may present barriers to interntational agreement.  See infra notes 284-91 and ac-
companying text. 
11 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 10, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (disclaiming any interpretation of the treaty 
that would limit existing or developing rules of international law). 
12 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl., Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (citing codification of the law of the sea as a 
main purpose of the convention); United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses pmbl., opened for signature May 21, 
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (citing codification of this area of international law as a main pur-
pose of the convention).  
13 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
14 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
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The conventional wisdom is that states codify customary law to 
clarify the law and promote compliance.  Claims that codification clar-
ifies the law, in particular, are legion.15  According to these arguments, 
codification allows states to specify more precisely what customary in-
ternational law requires, thereby facilitating deeper cooperation and 
avoiding costly disputes over vague legal rules.16  Codification also in-
troduces the possibility of attaching compliance-promoting mecha-
nisms—such as protocols granting international tribunals jurisdiction 
over disputes—to customary rules.17  Such mechanisms increase sanc-
tions for violating the law and are thereby thought to boost compli-
ance rates.  
These rationales, which I refer to as the Clarification and Compli-
ance Theses, only partially explain the allure of codification.  Both the 
Clarification and Compliance Theses focus primarily on efficiency.  
They suggest that states will take actions that increase overall global 
welfare.  For example, all else equal, agreeing to submit disputes to a 
tribunal should boost compliance by exposing violations.  But rational 
states generally are interested first and foremost in increasing their 
own welfare.  Increasing overall welfare is merely a means to that end, 
since it increases the size of the pie to be divided.  For states to do 
what is in the interest of overall welfare thus requires certain assump-
tions about interstate bargaining—such as low transaction costs—
which will often not hold in the real world. 
 
15 See, e.g., R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 
41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 293 (1965–1966) (arguing that treaties codifying law may 
influence, shape, and alter the law in signatory countries); Richard Falk, Reparations, 
International Law, and Global Justice:  A New Frontier (noting that the purpose of interna-
tional law is to “codif[y] behavioral trends in state practice and shift[] political attitudes 
on the part of governments with the intention of stabilizing and clarifying expectations 
about the future”), in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 478, 480 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 
2006); Bing Bing Jia, The Relations Between Treaties and Custom, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 81, 
108 (2010) (“[A] piece of authoritative work of codification . . . [is] intended to clarify 
and settle applicable rules of international law . . . .”); H. Lauterpacht, Codification and 
Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 16, 19 (1955) (“It is probably a fact 
that the absence of agreed rules partaking of a reasonable degree of certainty is a seri-
ous challenge to the legal nature of what goes by the name of international law.”); Iain 
Scobbie, The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of ‘Obligations Under Peremptory Norms 
of General International Law,’ 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1201, 1202 (2002) (equating the codifi-
cation of custom with its clarification). 
16 See infra Section II.A. 
17 See infra Section II.B. 
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I therefore introduce what I call the Capture Thesis of codifica-
tion.18  I argue that codification is often driven by distributional con-
cerns, rather than efficiency concerns.  States seek to codify customary 
rules that benefit their interests as a way to define and capture those 
rules.  Codifying customary rules is an attractive strategy because it all-
ows states to influence the content of rules that bind all states without 
having to negotiate a universal treaty, with all the costs and compro-
mises such negotiations entail.  
States capture customary international law through codification in 
two ways.  First, they use codification as a commitment device in situa-
tions in which the interpretation of a customary rule is unsettled.  
Codifying their understanding of the customary rule among them-
selves binds like-minded states to that understanding by raising the 
costs of adopting alternative interpretations.  This credible commit-
ment in turn pressures noncodifying states that wish to cooperate with 
codifying states to adopt the codified understanding of the customary 
rule, even when the noncodifying states would prefer an alternative 
interpretation.  Second, codification introduces explicit power-based 
bargaining dynamics that are absent from, or at least muted in, the 
formation of bare (i.e., uncodified) customary rules.  In particular, 
codification exchanges a largely unstructured customary lawmaking 
environment for a bargaining-based forum in which (1) influence can 
be limited through exclusion and agenda setting, and (2) onerous 
amendment processes can create veto power over changes in the law. 
The Capture Thesis makes clear that codification can replicate, 
magnify, or alter power dynamics present in the formation of bare cus-
tomary international law.  Thus, notwithstanding the benefits flowing 
from clarification and the creation of compliance mechanisms, codifi-
cation may result in legal rules that reduce global welfare.  This con-
clusion is important for the literature on whether decentralized forms 
of law, such as the common law or customary international law, evolve 
toward efficiency.  I argue that the use of power in the codification of 
custom can actually undercut, rather than promote, custom’s efficien-
cy.  Even where rules are not suboptimal from a welfare perspective, 
allowing powerful states to capture the gains from cooperation may 
delegitimize customary rules.  Finally, the Capture Thesis counter-
intuitively suggests that codification can sometimes increase fragmen-
tation:  if states with divergent views on how to interpret a customary 
 
18 See infra Part III. 
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rule pursue conflicting codification efforts, they can entrench schisms 
in the law along regional or ideological lines.19 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces 
the concept of codification and its history and explains how I use that 
concept here.  Part II develops the Clarification and Compliance The-
ses, discussing why, as a descriptive matter, they do not fully explain 
the codification of customary international law.  Part III sets forth the 
Capture Thesis, including the limits on codification’s use as a device to 
advance one’s self-interest, and illustrates the theory with examples 
such as the British campaign to outlaw the slave trade.  Part IV exam-
ines the unintended consequences of codification in light of the Cap-
ture Thesis, arguing that codification can actually lead to suboptimal 
customary rules and exacerbate the fragmentation of international law 
by entrenching differences along regional or ideological lines.  I illus-
trate these ill effects by analyzing how codification has prevented states 
from negotiating a multilateral treaty on investment.  I then conclude. 
I.  THE CONCEPT OF CODIFICATION 
Prior to the twentieth century, most international law was custom-
ary law.  Customary international law, as the commonly cited defini-
tion goes, “results from a general and consistent state practice” done 
out of “a sense of legal obligation.”20  This definition, although easily 
 
19 In so arguing, this Article contributes to the literature on strategic international 
lawmaking by states, and specifically on the relationship between different forms of 
legal commitments, such as treaties, soft law, and customary international law.  See, e.g., 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421, 434-50 (2000) (detailing the advantages of soft law, such as protected 
sovereignty, increased certainty, and more frequent compromise); Andrew T. Guzman 
& Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 176-79 (2010) 
(putting forth four explanations for why states use soft law); Barbara Koremenos, Loos-
ening the Ties that Bind:  A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55 INT’L ORG. 289, 290-
304 (2001) (developing a theoretical model for international agreements with respect 
to how states choose their international legal commitments); Kal Raustiala, Form and 
Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 583-85 (2005) (discussing 
legality, substance, and structure as three dimensions of the institutional design of in-
ternational agreements); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 564 
(2002) (attempting to reconcile custom and rational choice theory).   
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) (1987); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 (authorizing the International Court of Justice to apply “interna-
tional custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” in resolving interna-
tional disputes).  
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stated, turns out to be terribly difficult to apply.21  For example, there 
is little agreement as to how widespread the practice must be or how 
consistently states must follow the practice.22  More fundamentally, 
scholars and commentators do not agree on what kinds of practice are 
relevant.23  Do votes in the U.N. General Assembly count, or are more 
concrete actions required?  What about domestic laws?  As to the se-
cond requirement, how is one to tell whether a state took some action 
out of a sense of legal obligation, rather than expedience, habit, or 
some other reason?  Moreover, the definition is circular, insofar as it 
appears to require states to act out of a sense of legal obligation before 
such an obligation exists.24  The uncertainty injected into customary 
law by these practical difficulties raises serious questions about the util-
ity of customary law in regulating interstate relations. 
While scholars have spilled much ink attacking and defending cus-
tomary international law as such, states have largely responded to cus-
tom’s difficulties by turning customary law into treaty law; that is, they 
have responded with codification.  By codification, I mean the formu-
lation and reduction to a written instrument of rules of law that elabo-
rate established doctrines and precedents, which, even if nonbinding, 
have legal consequences.25  Codification solves some of the practical 
 
21 The literature critiquing the traditional formulation of custom is voluminous.  
For the most well-known critique, see ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).  D’Amato famously argued that the traditional test for 
custom is circular:  “But if custom creates law, how can a component of custom require 
that the creative acts be in accordance with some prior right or obligation in interna-
tional law?”  Id. at 53. 
22 See id. at 58 (decrying the lack of standard criteria to evaluate the amount of time 
required to define international law as customary). 
23 See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
115, 124-28 (2005) (reviewing the controversies over what counts as state practice for 
purposes of determining customary international law); see also D’AMATO, supra note 21, 
at 88 (arguing that only physical acts count as state practice, whereas claims made by 
states do not).  
24 See D’AMATO, supra note 21, at 53, 66 (summarizing attempts to rationalize this 
apparent circularity problem). 
25 Although I focus here primarily on binding legal instruments, this definition allows 
for the possibility, frequently realized in modern international legal practice, that legal 
consequences can flow from instruments that are not themselves legally binding.  Put 
differently, I consider “codifications” to be any nonbinding instruments that at least 
some states believe embody existing customary rules.  These instruments, sometimes 
termed “soft law,” include nonbinding declarations issued by states or certain draft 
articles issued by the ILC that are asserted to reflect customary law.  See, e.g., Draft Arti-
cles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, An-
nex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (codifying to some extent the customary 
law of state responsibility).  Such instruments have legal consequences to the extent 
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problems with customary law by clearly delineating the steps that mark 
the creation of a legal obligation.  For example, a codifying treaty 
might state that it enters into force upon a certain number of ratifica-
tions, an objective metric for the creation of legal obligations other-
wise lacking in the unstructured environment in which bare customary 
law forms.26  
Indeed, codification has been the elder and underappreciated sib-
ling of the twentieth century movement to establish international or-
ganizations and legalize international relations.  Codification and 
international organizations both seek to use substantive legal and pro-
cedural rules to structure and shape what would otherwise be unre-
strained political interactions among states.  International organizations 
have received the lion’s share of scholarly attention because, among 
other reasons, they tend to be durable, provide a venue to deal with 
multiple related issues over a period of time and in a way easily ame-
nable to study, and raise concerns about state sovereignty that are not 
as directly implicated in treaties that merely create rules of conduct.  
But codification is no less important.  The codification movement 
preceded and in many ways laid the groundwork for the development 
of international organizations.  Jeremy Bentham is credited with initi-
ating the codification movement in the late eighteenth century.27  At 
the international level, the movement gained steam during the late 
nineteenth century as a way to manage states’ increasing interrelation-
ships.  Some of the earliest efforts to codify international law occurred 
 
that they shape or reflect states’ understanding of what custom requires.  I would also 
include in this definition interpretative notes—such as those issued by authoritative 
bodies like the NAFTA Free Trade Commission—that are designed to give more pre-
cise content to legal obligations.  Where these obligations are codified customary obli-
gations, interpretative notes can serve the same function as a codifying treaty.  I 
exclude from my definition nonbinding documents that do not reflect any state’s un-
derstanding of custom, such as model laws or draft conventions that do not receive any 
state endorsement. 
26 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 126 (stating that the statute shall come 
into force upon ratification by sixty countries). 
27  Report of Sub-Committee Upon the History and Status of Codification, 4 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 208, 214-18 (1910); see also Arthur Watts, Codification and Progressive Development 
of International Law (providing a comprehensive overview of the history of international 
codification), available at http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/ 
epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e1380&recno=1&author=Watts%20QC%20%20Arthur, 
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 
2012) (forthcoming). 
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in 1873, when both the International Law Association (ILA) and the 
Institut de Droit International were founded.28  
The earliest intergovernmental bodies aimed at codification were 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law—founded in 
1893 and still the leading body for the codification of private interna-
tional law—and the Pan-American Union (now the Organization of 
American States).29  In public international law, the Hague Peace Con-
ferences of 1899 and 1907, which predated the creation of the League 
of Nations, presented the first multilateral opportunities to consider 
codification.30  After its creation, the League of Nations renewed these 
codification efforts, adopting a series of resolutions identifying a need 
for the progressive codification of international law.31  In the wake of 
World War I, Judge Manley Hudson of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice noted that the “revival of interest in the codification of 
international law” was driven by the perceived need to “formulat[e] 
and re-establish[] and clarify[] international law.”32  This pressure cul-
minated in the 1930 League of Nations Conference on the Progressive 
Codification of International Law, which, much like the League that 
sponsored it, has not been counted a success.33 
Prior to World War II, then, neither codification efforts nor inter-
national organizations such as the League of Nations were terribly suc-
cessful in legalizing international relations.  Subsequent codification 
efforts under the auspices of the United Nations have met with greater 
success.  In modern legal practice, the ILC is by far the most important 
organ of codification, despite the existence of many regional institu-
tions devoted to codification, some of which are older than the ILC.34  
 
28 For an account of the early history of international codification efforts, see 
BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 8, at 163-64. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 165-66. 
31 See, e.g., Resolution of Sept. 25, 1931, 12 League of Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. 92, 
at 9 (1931); Resolution of Sept. 27, 1927, 8 League of Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. 53, at 
9-10 (1927); Resolution of Sept. 22, 1924, 5 League of Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. 21, at 
10 (1924). 
32 Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 
245, 256 (1922). 
33 See Guillaume Sacriste & Antoine Vauchez, The Force of International Law:  Lawyers’ 
Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 83, 101 (2007) 
(discussing the failure of this conference in the broader context of the interwar inter-
national law community).  
34 Examples include the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Asian-African 
Legal Consultative Committee, and the European Committee on Legal Cooperation.  
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In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly created the ILC pursuant to its 
mandate under article 13 of the U.N. Charter to “encourag[e] the 
progressive development of international law and its codification.”35  
The General Assembly charged the ILC with “the promotion of the 
progressive development of international law and its codification.”36  
The ILC stands at the front end of a state-centric process of lawmaking, 
preparing draft articles for states to consider adopting as treaties.37  The 
ILC has produced codifications of many of the foundational areas of 
international law, including the law of treaties, diplomatic and consular 
law, and the law of the sea.38  Today, codification continues to be a crit-
ical lawmaking tool at states’ disposal, as evidenced by the debates on 
whether the United States should ratify the U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and by the 2010 negotiations over codifying the crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statute.39 
 
See, e.g., B. Graefrath, The International Law Commission Tomorrow, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 595, 
608 (1991) (discussing other codifying institutions). 
35 U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1.  This mandate is carried out in a variety of other 
ways, including through ad hoc committee reports to the Sixth Committee (Legal) of 
the General Assembly and by specialized organs of the United Nations, such as the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP).  For a discussion of these committees and 
organs, see BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 8, at 167-68. 
36 Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21, 1947) [hereinafter ILC Statute]. 
37 Given this fact, it is perhaps not surprising that the composition of the ILC has 
been a subject of contestation and revision.  At its inception, the ILC had only fifteen 
members, eight of whom were from Europe or the United States, with an additional 
four from Latin America, three from Asia, and none from Africa.  JEFFREY S. MORTON, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 8-9 (2000).  To ac-
commodate the growth in the number of U.N. member states, the ILC’s membership 
has been expanded three times:  in 1957 to twenty-one, in 1962 to twenty-five, and in 
1981 to thirty-four.  Id.  Each expansion diluted the share of American and European 
seats, and there is evidence that this expansion increased partisan dynamics at the ILC.  
Using a dataset compiled from public records of ILC proceedings during the develop-
ment of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Profes-
sor Morton argues that the ILC members show high levels of geographic and ideological 
cohesion.  Id. at 83-92.  This cohesion, he asserts, is inconsistent with an apolitical view of 
the ILC membership advocated by many scholars and practitioners.  Id.   
38 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter VCLT]; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 47.2(b), Apr. 
18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR]; Convention on the 
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 
39 Nonstate actors also play an important role in codification in at least two ways.  
First, they can influence states’ negotiation of a codifying treaty, much in the way NGOs 
participated in the negotiation of the Rome Statute.  See William R. Pace & Mark 
Thieroff, Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (describing how many “gov-
ernments, the Secretary General, other United Nations officials and media experts 
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Despite codification’s continued significance in international rela-
tions, codification as a lawmaking technique has largely been relegated 
to an afterthought in contemporary scholarship.  This is puzzling, be-
cause practicing international lawyers pay an enormous amount of 
attention to the dynamic relationship between treaties and custom.  
The United States’ Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, for example, 
goes out of its way to include an annex confirming that the treaty’s 
substantive rules reflect the parties’ view of customary law.40  Similarly, 
delegates spent much time at the 2010 International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Review Conference negotiating interpretive understandings 
governing the relationship between the adopted definition of the 
crime of aggression and the background customary law.41 
Nevertheless, the scholarly commentary’s casual references to trea-
ties codifying existing customary norms seem to suggest that codifica-
tion is simply the practice of reducing an uncontested legal rule to 
written form.  The real work is done, one might infer, in the custom-
ary process that produced the rule being codified.  Alternatively, the 
difficult work of international lawmaking might have been done in 
treaty negotiations that eventually developed into new rules of cus-
tomary international law.  In these situations, customary law is almost 
conceived of as a passive recipient of settled norms worked out 
through treaty negotiations against a tabula rasa.  In either conception, 
 
have commented on the decisive role of NGOs at the Rome Conference”), in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE:  ISSUES, NEGOTI-
ATIONS, RESULTS 391, 392-93 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).  Second, nonstate actors can 
“codify” the law themselves, although they generally lack the ability to make their “codi-
fications” binding on states directly.  See Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation in 
International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 997 (2011) (discuss-
ing Professor Francis Lieber’s codification of the customary laws of war in the Lieber 
Code, one of the most well-known private codification efforts).  Nevertheless, states can 
adopt these nonbinding codifications as evidence of their views of custom.  I defer de-
tailed examination of the role nonstate actors play in codification to future work, focus-
ing here instead on state-centric codification efforts.   
40 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2004 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, 
annexes A, B, art. 5(1) (2004) [hereinafter 2004 U.S. MODEL BIT], available at http:// 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf (“Each Party shall accord to cov-
ered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”). 
41 See Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal 
Court, The Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. RC/Res. 6, annex III ( June 11, 2010) (not-
ing that the definition of the crime of aggression, consistent with article 10 of the 
Rome Statute, should not limit or prejudice existing or developing rules of interna-
tional law). 
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treaties and custom interact gingerly, each disturbing the other only 
after appropriate deliberation and development. 
The sharp dichotomy of this approach is reflected in the way codi-
fication is conceived of in the context of adjudication, as compared to 
its conception in the actual practice of lawmaking.  In dispute resolu-
tion, when determining whether a treaty codifies customary interna-
tional law, the question is generally reduced to whether the precise 
treaty rule in question was a customary rule when the treaty came into 
force.42  In the context of lawmaking, however, this static conception of 
codification has generally been rejected in favor of a more dynamic 
understanding of the relationship between abstract customary rules 
that are agreed to be law and the more precise formulations of those 
rules that may be contested.  For example, although the ILC Statute 
makes a distinction between the codification of international law and 
its progressive development,43 in practice the distinction has had little 
effect.44  As Hersch Lauterpacht, who served both on the ILC and as a 
judge on the International Court of Justice, put it,  
[O]nce we approach at close quarters practically any branch of interna-
tional law, we are driven, amidst some feeling of incredulity, to the con-
clusion that although there is as a rule a consensus of opinion on broad 
principle . . . there is no semblance of agreement in relation to specific 
rules and problems.45 
Thus, in practice, codification has been an exercise in identifying 
areas of custom and attempting to fill in the gaps.  It is in this dynamic 
sense that I use the term “codification.”  Seen in this light, codification 
plays a role often thought to be reserved for adjudication in common 
law systems.  In the domestic context, for example, the creation of a 
standard is understood as a delegation to courts to fill in the content 
 
42 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) set forth ways in which treaties can be re-
lated to customary rules in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.  There, the ICJ decided 
that treaty rules (1) may declare customary rules, (2) crystallize emergent customary rules, 
or (3) over time become customary rules.  North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; 
F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 39, 41-42 (Feb. 20).  Treaty rules in category (3) are not 
properly thought of as codifications, because they are not initially claimed to be custom. 
43 ILC Statute, supra note 36, art. 15 (offering separate definitions for the progres-
sive development of international law and the codification of international law).  
44 See Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 17 (“[T]here is very little to codify if by that 
term is meant no more than giving, [in the language of ILC statute, article 15], preci-
sion and systematic order to rules of international law . . . .”).  
45 Id.  
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of a law ex post.46  In the international context, though, delegations to 
courts are relatively rare, and international courts lack the procedural 
rules, such as compulsory jurisdiction and stare decisis, that give do-
mestic judicial decisions expansive effect.47  Given the weakness of 
most international tribunals, negotiations between states are the inter-
national legal system’s most important method of developing the con-
tent of vague or ambiguous customary rules in most areas of 
international law.48  
This elaborating effect also differentiates codification from treaty 
negotiations that do not occur against the background of existing cus-
tomary rules.  States have at their disposal a variety of political and 
economic tools to induce other states to accept legal obligations.  
What distinguishes codification is that it works against a backdrop of 
existing state beliefs.  Influencing state beliefs about marginal changes 
in a rule—about a rule’s specifics—is easier than persuading states that 
an entirely new rule exists or should be adopted.  All states believe, for 
example, that customary international law requires that diplomats and 
diplomatic missions receive certain types of privileges and immunities.  
What they disagree about is not the general rule, but the specifics:  for 
 
46 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 591 (1992) (noting that certain “standard[s] make[] . . . ex post, case-by-case de-
terminations”). 
47 See, e.g., Guzman & Meyer, supra note 19, at 201-06 (describing the ICL as mak-
ing “nonbinding rulings or standards”); see also Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Land-
sidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2008) (“When 
one turns to examine instances of international delegation, what becomes immediately 
apparent, at least to the authors, is how little of it there actually is.”).  In the domestic 
context, the adjudication of questions likely to reappear before the courts is a strategic 
enterprise because of the path dependence of adjudicated law.  Repeat litigants try to 
ensure that early decisions set forth favorable rules that they can employ in future liti-
gation.  See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process:  The Para-
dox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAW & SOC. REV. 869, 877-86 (1999) (describing strategic 
decisionmaking in the U.S. litigation process); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Con-
tract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1145-58 (2006) (discussing the problems pre-
sent in litigating interpretations of boilerplate contract terms).  
48 See Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 22 (“[T]he task of codifying international 
law . . . must be primarily one of bringing about an agreed body of rules . . . .”); see also 
Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 631, 633 
(2007) (arguing that some rules are better worked out through adjudication, while 
others are better worked out through negotiation).  The proliferation of international 
tribunals has, to some extent, changed this practice.  Some courts, such as the Europe-
an Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights, play a major role in inter-
preting supranational, if not international, obligations.  Nevertheless, compared with 
domestic courts, the level of delegation to international tribunals, where states are con-
strained by the tribunal’s decisions going forward, remains quite low.  
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instance, does the inviolability of diplomats prevent airport security 
from searching them?49  Arguments about the answer make reference 
to an existing body of law on the subject of diplomatic immunity.  And 
because the arguments rest on established law, they increase the costs 
for failing to adhere to the opposing side’s arguments.  These costs—
the costs of being judged in noncompliance with the generally appli-
cable customary rule—are not present when states use political pres-
sure to advocate adoption of a pure treaty rule.  Codifications, as I use 
that term, are signals about what codifying states believe customary law 
requires and are therefore signals about the legal (as opposed to polit-
ical or economic) costs of failing to adhere to the codified rule. 
II.  APPROACHES TO CODIFICATION 
The problem of codification is, of course, not a new one.  The ex-
tant literature contains several rationales as to why states might codify 
customary international law.  I discuss what I take to be the two domi-
nant rationales here:  what I term the Clarification Thesis and the 
Compliance Thesis.  Although the Clarification and Compliance The-
ses explain much about the drive to codify customary international 
law, they are undertheorized.  In this Part, I develop these two theses 
and illustrate why they fail to fully explain states’ interest in codification. 
A.  Clarification 
Customary international law has a reputation for vagueness and 
ambiguity.50  This reputation is in some respects well deserved. Pur-
ported customary rules, such as the precautionary principle, are so 
vague that they offer little guidance in application.51  The drive to clar-
ify customary rules to promote cooperation between states (and in-
crease their overall welfare) has long been offered as a rationale for 
codification.52  The “Clarification Thesis” is the notion that codifica-
 
49 See India:  Airport Pat-Down Draws Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at A8 (report-
ing that the Indian foreign minister considered the pat-down of an ambassador to be 
“unacceptable”). 
50 See, e.g., George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law 
Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 548 n.34 (2005) (considering the suggestion that custom-
ary international law may be less detailed than treaty norms).  
51 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 494, 500 (2008) (“Some argue that the precautionary principle is hampered by a 
lack of clarity, or, at least, agreement as to the principle’s meaning.” (footnote omitted)).  
52 For example, Lauterpacht has argued, 
Meyer FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/12/2012 4:36 PM 
2012] Codifying Custom 1011 
tion is driven by a desire to clarify what customary rules require in or-
der to promote cooperation and increase global welfare.53  I develop 
an account of when clarity in legal obligations increases overall wel-
fare.  Clarification is not an unalloyed good, however, and I illustrate 
how the need for clarity does not fully explain the codification of cus-
tomary international law.  
Customary international law usually fails to define precisely the le-
gal rights or obligations it creates.  The rights and obligations are am-
biguous in ways that create disputes or lead to coordination failures.  
These disputes, in turn, are costly to states, creating incentives to clari-
fy what the law requires.  By way of example, consider the diplomatic 
pouch or “bag,” the device that foreign missions use to transport offi-
cial items free of search by the host government.  According to the 
leading commentator on diplomatic law, no “limits on size or weight 
[of the bag can] be deduced from international practice.”54  As a re-
sult, states are not infrequently drawn into disputes about whether a 
particular shipment is too large to qualify for protection as a diplomatic 
bag.  In 1985, to cite one public example, the Federal Republic of 
Germany refused to recognize a Soviet truck with a total load of 9000 
kilograms as a single diplomatic pouch.55  Even today, some countries 
(for example, China) impose limits on the size and weight of the dip-
lomatic pouch, which arguably violate customary international law.56  
These limitations, in turn, create costly conflicts, as states are unable to 
coordinate their behavior and must expend resources negotiating for 
 
[T]he absence of agreed rules partaking of a reasonable degree of certainty is 
a serious challenge to the legal nature of what goes by the name of interna-
tional law.  That circumstance alone supplies cogent proof of the justification, 
nay, of the urgency of the task of codification of international law. 
Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 19; see also John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of 
Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law:  The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 229, 239 (2003) (“The first advantage of multilateral agreements over custom-
ary international law is that they provide a more precise definition of the agreed upon 
rule for the simple reason that the provisions to which states have agreed are written 
down in the text of the agreement.”).  
53 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 46, at 608-11 (discussing how codification enhances 
predictability and agreement between two branches of government). 
54 EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW:  A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 189 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1998) (1976). 
55 Id.  
56 See Zhu Lijiang, Chinese Practice in Public International Law:  2008, 8 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 493, 537 (2009) (stating that Chinese law provides that “[d]iplomatic pouches 
sent or received by a diplomatic mission shall . . . comply with the relevant provisions of 
the Chinese government on the weight and dimensions of diplomatic pouches”).   
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rights they believe they already possess and on which they base their 
global operating procedures.57   
Although clarity is often beneficial, it is not always so.  The litera-
ture on rules versus standards allows us to think more carefully about 
the precise conditions under which clarity (i.e., a rule) is likely to in-
crease overall welfare.58  To assess whether a rule or standard is more 
appropriate, we must weigh the ex ante net costs of elaborating the 
rule against the net costs of having to apply, comply with, and subse-
quently clarify an imprecise standard.59  Clarification should increase 
overall welfare when the net present costs of clarification are less than 
the net present costs of deferring clarification.  However, as I explain 
below, even where the net present costs of clarification are less than 
the net present costs of deferring clarification, the clarification ra-
tionale still may not descriptively explain codification.  The reason is 
that familiar bargaining problems, such as transaction costs and hold-
outs, may prevent states from converting a welfare-improving change 
in the law into one that makes all parties at least as well off as they 
would be under the status quo. 
The costs of ex ante clarification in the international context flow 
from (1) transaction costs of negotiations, (2) investing in complying 
with a clearer rule, and (3) violations that would not have occurred 
but for the clearer rule.  The chief benefit of ex ante clarification is 
increased cooperation.  First, consider the associated transaction costs.  
Discount rates—the idea that receiving something of the same value in 
the future is worth less than receiving it today—mean that, viewed in 
isolation, the deferral of the transaction costs of clarification is cost 
effective if those costs do not increase. By contrast, where transaction 
costs are expected to rise, such as where more parties will have to par-
ticipate in a negotiation in the future, ex ante clarification will be cost 
effective.  Thus, transaction costs do not necessarily favor clarification, 
 
57 Moreover, as Lauterpacht observed, conflicts that arise from uncertainty about 
the content of customary international law are potentially even costlier than similar 
disputes in the domestic system because states engage in reprisals rather than turning 
to courts to resolve disputes.  See Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 20 (“Within the state 
obscurity and uncertainty of the law are a drawback, but it is a drawback which is provi-
sional inasmuch as the uncertainty can be removed with regard to a particular contro-
versy by the decision of a court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction.  This is not the 
position among states.”). 
58 For an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of rules and standards, see 
Kaplow, supra note 46, at 585.  
59 See, e.g., id. at 579 (advocating an economic analysis of costs and benefits at each 
stage of rule creation and enforcement). 
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particularly when states expect transaction costs to be stable or de-
crease over time. 
Second, clearer rules promote compliance by delineating what 
counts as compliant conduct.60  In doing so, clearer rules may avert 
some subsequent noncompliant actions, an obvious benefit of clarifi-
cation (and a cost of deferring clarification).  They may also save the 
cost of conflicts that arise in disputing the meaning of unclear rules.  
However, clarifying the law ex ante also has its costs:  it will frequently 
force states to move away from their status quo behavior.  For example, 
clarifying the precautionary principle to allow states to ban the sale of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) would place costs on those 
nations that regularly use GMOs in agriculture.61  The costs of comply-
ing with a clearer rule are unlikely to be borne evenly by all states.  Ra-
ther, the allocation of the costs and benefits of compliance with a 
clearer rule is likely to depend on the specific rule chosen.  
Finally, clearer rules may make unlawful certain actions that would 
otherwise be undeterrable.  Making undeterrable actions unlawful re-
sults in a net loss to the parties, both because there is a penalty for vio-
lating the law that would not otherwise be incurred and because there 
is no offsetting gain to nonviolating states.62  Ex ante clarification can 
thus impose net costs on the parties where the costs associated with 
making undeterrable actions unlawful outweighs the benefits from 
greater cooperation under the clarified standard.  Moreover, like the 
costs of compliance, the costs of undeterrable violations are likely to 
be unevenly distributed among the parties. 
Taken together, these criteria suggest that clarification will be de-
sirable from an overall welfare standpoint when (1) the transaction costs 
of clarification are expected to increase over time, (2) clearer rules are 
likely to influence the behavior of states, (3) the costs of complying with 
clearer rules are low, and (4) the benefits of increased cooperation are 
high.  In some instances, the joint net costs of ex ante clarification will 
not justify any substantial state investment in clarifying the law.  
 
60 See id. at 608 & n.138 (explaining that rules provide clearer notice to actors, al-
lowing for increased compliance). 
61 For an excellent analysis of the dispute between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union over genetically modified organisms, see generally MARK A. POLLACK & 
GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS:  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLI-
TICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009). 
62 Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
579, 582 (2005) (arguing that international sanctions create a loss to one party without 
an offsetting gain, yielding a net loss).   
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Moreover, even where clarification can be justified in cost-benefit 
terms, clarification frequently may not occur.  The foregoing analysis 
has focused on overall welfare.  Put in terms of efficiency, I have asked 
whether a clarifying change in the law is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, mean-
ing that it increases net welfare even if some states are made individu-
ally worse off.63  International law, though, generally requires that 
states consent to a rule before they are bound.64  The result of the con-
sent requirement in international law is that changes in the law that 
are merely Kaldor-Hicks improvements will not survive the codification 
process.65  States will not agree to changes in customary rules that 
make them worse off, even if states as a whole are made better off by 
the change.  States will agree to a change in the law only if it benefits 
them individually; that is, in the consent-driven process at the core of 
international law, states will agree only to Pareto-improving changes in 
the law, meaning changes in the law that make no state worse off and 
at least one state better off.  This fact is particularly important given 
that the costs of clarification are unlikely to fall evenly on states, mean-
ing that in many instances changing the law will make some state 
worse off.  
As a matter of bargaining theory, of course, any Kaldor-Hicks effi-
cient improvement in the law can be transformed into a Pareto-
improving change through transfers to states that are otherwise net 
losers.66  But in the real world, transaction costs are often quite high.  
Since transaction costs reduce the surplus available for transfers to net 
losers, such costs may prohibit the conversion of Kaldor-Hicks im-
provements into Pareto improvements.  Moreover, once the possibility 
of transfers has been introduced, states may hold out for a greater 
 
63 Technically, a change in the law is Kaldor-Hicks superior to the status quo if, as-
suming zero transaction costs, it is possible to imagine transfers such that the change in 
the law is Pareto superior to the status quo.  The transfers need not actually occur, 
however, and thus some states can be left worse off by a Kaldor-Hicks improvement in 
the law.  Andrew T. Guzman, The Consent Problem in International Law 6 ( June 14, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1862354. 
64 See id. at 1 n.2 (citing a number of authorities for the proposition that interna-
tional law is predicated on consent); see also Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual Interna-
tional Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of requiring state consent to international agreements). 
65 See Guzman, supra note 63, at 6 (“In less technical language, requiring consent 
frustrates many potential arrangements that would improve the lot of the states as a 
whole.”). 
66 Guzman & Meyer, supra note 19, at 198.   
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share of the benefits from cooperation, thus further delaying or derail-
ing agreement.  
Thus, the Clarification Thesis—understood to be the descriptive 
claim that states codify customary international law because clarity is to 
their joint benefit—is limited by the realities of the way states behave 
when making legal rules.  Rational states are concerned with overall 
welfare only to the extent that increasing overall welfare enlarges the 
pie in a way that will allow them to increase their individual share of 
the benefits from cooperation.  The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of interna-
tional law is not a primary concern of rational states, only a derivative 
one.  The Clarification Thesis thus explains the drive to codify cus-
tomary international law when clarification increases overall welfare 
and when transaction costs are sufficiently low to allow the conversion 
of welfare-enhancing gains into Pareto-improving gains.  But the Clari-
fication Thesis by itself cannot explain codification in areas in which 
there are sharp distributional consequences to clarifying the law and 
when familiar bargaining problems prevent states from creating a legal 
regime that redistributes the benefits of cooperation.  
Consider, as an example, the Arab Charter on Human Rights.67  
The most recent version of the Charter was adopted by the League of 
Arab States in 2004 and came into force in 2008.68  The U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights greeted the Arab Charter with 
guarded enthusiasm.  While welcoming the ratification required to 
“bring the Arab Charter on Human Rights into force,” the High 
Commissioner noted that the Charter conflicted with universal human 
rights norms in its treatment of the legality of the death penalty for 
children and by equating Zionism with racism.69  In particular, the 
Charter states that the “[s]entence of death shall not be inflicted on 
persons under 18 years of age, unless otherwise stipulated in the laws in 
force at the time of the commission of the crime.”70  The Charter also 
 
67 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, May 22, 2004 [here-
inafter Arab Charter], translated in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893, 895 (2005).  The nego-
tiation of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute also illustrates how codification 
may not result in clarification.  Codifying states may deliberately obscure a rule as a 
compromise between two different interpretations.  See infra Section III.D.   
68 Mervat Rishmawi, The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States:  
An Update, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 169, 169 (2010).  
69 Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Statement by UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Entry into Force of the Arab Charter on Hu-
man Rights ( Jan. 30, 2008), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane. 
nsf/0/6C211162E43235FAC12573E00056E19D?opendocument. 
70 Arab Charter, supra note 67, art. 7 (emphasis added).  
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“[r]eject[s] all forms of racism and Zionism, which constitute a viola-
tion of human rights.”71 
The codification of these particular human rights reflects a disa-
greement over the correct way to interpret established customary 
rules.  To be sure, the Arab Charter does clarify the Arab League’s in-
terpretation of racism, which the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
clearly identifies as a violation of customary international law.72  But 
this clarification is hardly likely to improve cooperation among states 
in stamping out racial discrimination or to reduce conflict in the way 
that the Clarification Thesis imagines.  The question of whether Zion-
ism is a form of racism banned by custom has been hotly contested 
over the years.  In 1975, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 
3379, which “determine[d] that Zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination.”73  That resolution was repealed in 1991 by Resolution 
46/86.74  By codifying their preferred interpretation of the rule, Arab 
states attempted to influence the content of the customary prohibition 
on racism for their own benefit.  Specifically, Arab states acted defen-
sively to codify their minority interpretation of a customary rule.  As I 
argue below, used in this way, codification acts as a commitment device, 
binding a group of states to a particular interpretation of customary 
rules, rather than as an effort to clarify universally applicable legal rules.  
B.  Compliance 
Having explained the logic and limits of the Clarification Thesis, I 
now explain why concerns about promoting compliance also fail to 
explain codification.  Customary international law is for the most part 
comprised of rules of conduct.  That is, customary international legal 
rules create legal rights and obligations, such as the right to exercise 
sovereignty over the territorial sea and the obligation to refrain from 
committing genocide.  Treaties, however, can include a variety of 
mechanisms, such as monitoring mechanisms or jurisdictional proto-
cols, that can further promote compliance.  As governments have fre-
quently recognized, codification can therefore improve compliance 
with customary rules by appending to these rules compliance-
 
71 Id. pmbl.  
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 702(i) (1987). 
73 G.A. Res. 3379 (XXX), ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3379 (Nov. 10, 1975).  
74 G.A. Res. 46/86, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/86 (Dec. 16, 1991). 
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promoting mechanisms that generally do not exist in customary inter-
national law.75  I refer to this rationale for codification as the Compli-
ance Thesis.   
The mere existence of rules of conduct can change the way states 
behave when, for example, decentralized penalties, such as reputa-
tional sanctions, exist for violating the rules of conduct.  But while 
bare rules of conduct can affect state behavior, their mere existence may 
be insufficient to promote an ideal level of compliance.  Bare rules do 
not address international law’s overarching problem:  the problem of 
enforcement.  International law is mostly a self-help system, in the sense 
that there is no centralized enforcement mechanism.  States may there-
fore wish to create certain mechanisms that are likely to raise the costs 
of noncompliance with the substantive rules of conduct.   
Codification allows states to solve the enforcement problem in a 
variety of ways.  Most importantly, codification gives states the chance 
to provide advance consent to dispute resolution provisions.  For ex-
ample, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations grants jurisdiction over disputes arising under that Conven-
tion to the International Court of Justice.76  Similarly, the U.N. Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea establishes the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea to resolve disputes.77  Bilateral investment trea-
ties and the investment chapters of regional free trade agreements are 
noted less for the manner in which they codify customary internation-
al law and more for the fact that their arbitration provisions create a 
private cause of action against host states that did not exist under cus-
tomary international law.  And in defining the crimes over which the 
ICC has jurisdiction, the Rome Statute codifies much of the substan-
 
75 For example, the U.S. delegate to the conference negotiating the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations proposed a jurisdictional protocol, arguing that “the 
codification of international law and the formulation of measures to ensure compli-
ance with its provisions should go hand in hand.”  1 United Nations Conference on 
Consular Relations, Mar. 4–Apr. 22, 1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, at 249, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16 (Mar. 26, 1963); see also U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. 
at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (transcribing the Czech delegate’s remark 
that the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as a “break-
through” in the codification of international law). 
76 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning 
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 
[hereinafter VCCR Optional Protocol on Disputes].  
77 UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 188; Statute for the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561. 
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tive international criminal law developed in the twentieth century.78  
The codification exercise, however, was less about agreeing on the 
substantive rules of conduct and considerably more about creating an 
international mechanism for the enforcement of customary rules.  
Codification also allows states to create ancillary monitoring and 
enforcement obligations that are specific to the customary rule codi-
fied.  Treaties can create self-reporting obligations for states that allow 
other states and monitoring bodies to judge whether a state is honor-
ing its customary obligations.  For example, the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights, which is thought to codify certain 
customary human rights obligations,79 contains self-reporting require-
ments.80  The CAT, which codifies the customary prohibition against 
torture, also requires states to report on measures taken to comply 
with the Convention.81  The CAT requires states to criminalize acts of 
torture in their domestic law and to investigate and either extradite or 
prosecute those who have committed such acts.82  These treaties thus 
create a variety of enforcement obligations that do not necessarily ac-
company the bare customary obligations that the treaties codify.  
Finally, codification can have an effect on custom’s status as do-
mestic law.  For example, in the United States, some scholars have 
suggested that in the wake of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins83 customary 
international law should be treated as state, rather than federal, com-
mon law.84  To the extent this view is adopted by courts, codification 
 
78 See Leena Grover, A Call to Arms:  Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpreta-
tion of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 543, 
569 (2010) (describing the Rome Statute’s effect as “the crystallization of certain [in-
ternational] norms”). 
79 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions:  Courting Illegality, 23 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2001) (arguing that the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights sets forth a minimum standard of due process and human rights guar-
anteed to all people); Kweku Vanderpuye, Traditions in Conflict:  The Internationalization 
of Confrontation, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 513, 539 (2010) (noting that article 14 of the 
Covenant sets forth universally recognized human rights obligations).  
80 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 40, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (providing details 
of required reports that all states must submit upon adopted measures).  
81 CAT, supra note 14, art. 19 (outlining who submits these mandatory reports and 
what they must contain). 
82 Id. arts. 5-9.  
83 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
84 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870 (1997) (assert-
ing that customary international law should be treated as state law, absent federal 
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restores custom to its status as federal law by operation of the Suprem-
acy Clause.85  This, in turn, may allow federal courts to act as enforcers 
of international legal obligations. 
Although the compliance benefits of codification are significant—
and may, in individual cases, drive the decision to codify—they do not 
fully explain the phenomenon of codification.  Many of the most im-
portant codifying treaties fail to employ any of the features identified 
above that can make codification attractive.  The Vienna Conventions 
on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, for example, do not create 
mandatory dispute resolution procedures or enforcement or monitor-
ing obligations.86  And while treaties may clarify custom’s status in do-
mestic law, that benefit is specific to countries that make a distinction 
between custom and treaties in terms of domestic effect.  In Germany, 
for example, customary international law trumps inconsistent statutes.87  
Moreover, even where dispute resolution, enforcement, and reporting 
obligations exist, institutional design and international politics may 
render those devices ineffective.  Consider the attempts to define the 
crime of aggression in the Rome Statute.  After years of negotiation, 
the 2010 ICC Review Conference held in Kampala succeeded in adopt-
ing a definition,88 but this success was complicated by the inclusion of 
restrictive “jurisdictional paths” through which the ICC could actually 
obtain jurisdiction over allegations of criminal aggression.89   
Individual states’ resistance to compliance-inducing mechanisms is 
hardly a surprise.  First, just as with the Clarification Thesis, there is a 
 
common law); Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Contin-
uing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 891-92 (2007) (providing a more updated 
analysis after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), and other case law dealing 
with the treatment of international law as nonfederal common law).  But see Harold 
Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1824, 1827 (1998) (arguing that customary international law is federal law).  
85 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
86 Each convention contains an optional protocol on disputes.  See, e.g., VCCR Op-
tional Protocol on Disputes, supra note 76. 
87 See Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 
AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 790 (1984) (using conflicting antitrust law to demonstrate Germa-
ny’s reliance upon customary international law).  
88 ICC, supra note 41, at 18.  
89 See id. at 19 (addressing the way in which jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion may and may not be exercised); see also Diane Marie Amann, The Crime of Aggres-
sion, the United States, and the Value of Peace 8-11 (Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (analyzing potential jurisdictional paths that could 
arise if states adopted certain amendments to international criminal law).  
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threshold question of whether the joint costs of compliance-enhancing 
mechanisms outweigh the benefits.  Because sanctions are negative 
sum in the international system, there will be instances in which the 
joint expected costs of compliance-enhancing mechanisms outweigh 
the joint expected benefits.90  Second, the same distributive issues must 
be addressed even in situations in which compliance mechanisms are 
justified by reference to joint welfare.  
Compliance mechanisms raise the costs of codification most for 
those states that are likely to be noncompliant.  Those states need to 
be compensated for agreeing to higher penalties for noncompliance.  
But just as with the Clarification Thesis, transaction costs and holdouts 
may make the necessary transfers or side payments impossible.  The 
United States, for example, refuses to join the Rome Statute.  In such 
situations, where states are unable to address the distributional issues 
that arise from creating greater sanctions for noncompliance (or clari-
fication), neither the Compliance nor Clarification Theses can ade-
quately explain codification.  Instead, we must look to distributional 
considerations as the primary motivator of codification.  Part III of this 
Article turns to this analysis. 
III.  THE CAPTURE THESIS 
The Compliance and Clarification Theses are, in economic terms, 
efficiency theses.  Clarifying the substantive content of legal rules or 
bolstering substantive rules with compliance-promoting mechanisms 
can increase the aggregate welfare of states.  Assuming transaction 
costs are low, states should be able to create transfers sufficient to 
make every state at least as well off under the codified regime as it 
would be under the uncodified regime. 
In the real world, however, transaction costs are frequently quite 
high, and rational states are not interested in increasing aggregate wel-
fare as an end in itself.  They are interested in maximizing their own 
individual welfare, and increasing aggregate welfare is only a means to 
that end.  We should thus expect states to pursue codification as a 
means to attaining customary rules that serve their own interests, re-
gardless of whether aggregate welfare is increased.  I refer to the thesis 
that codification is driven by distributive concerns—rather than effi-
ciency concerns—as the Capture Thesis.  In this Part, I develop the 
 
90 See Guzman, supra note 62, at 582 (outlining how a state may do itself more harm 
than good through adopting compliance-enhancing mechanisms).  
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Capture Thesis and explain how states can use codification as a mech-
anism to lock in customary rules favorable to their interests.  In Part IV, 
I examine some of the ramifications of this strategy, including the codi-
fication of globally suboptimal rules and the fact that, perversely, codi-
fication can actually increase the fragmentation of international law. 
A.  The Intuition 
I begin this Section by sketching out the intuition behind the Cap-
ture Thesis.  I develop the thesis more fully in the sections that follow. 
To start, it is useful to say a few words about how customary inter-
national law is formed in the absence of codification.  As discussed 
above, customary international law has a rule of recognition:  the ex-
istence of a rule of custom is evidenced by a consistent state practice 
done out of a sense of legal obligation.91  Custom does not, however, 
have any procedures for establishing the requisite practice or sense of 
legal obligation.  There is no legislature to vote and no deposit of a 
ratification instrument to signal consent to be bound.  Customary in-
ternational law is, in short, formed in an environment that is not struc-
tured by the procedural rules and explicit commitments that mark the 
formation of most legal rules, including treaty rules. 
In such an environment, the formation and content of customary 
rules are uncertain.  As one of the leading theories of the formation of 
custom has it, bare custom is essentially formed through a process of 
legal claims backed by actions.92  These legal claims may be isolated 
events.  That is, state A makes a claim against state B, and state C 
makes an unrelated claim against state D.93  As the resolution of these 
claims coalesces around a rule, we say that a customary rule has 
formed.  The more frequently disputes are resolved in accordance with 
a putative customary rule, the more likely we are to say that such a rule 
exists.  Custom can also change through a similar process of accretion 
as legal claims are resolved contrary to a status quo customary rule.94 
 
91 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
92 See D’AMATO, supra note 21, at 92-98 (discussing the process of custom formation 
and modification through the use of several “hypothetical conflict-of-custom situations”).   
93 Id. at 92-93. 
94 See id. at 97-98 (“The number of disconfirmatory acts required to replace [an] 
original rule is a function partly of the number of acts that established the original 
rule . . . , the remoteness in time of the establishing acts, the legal authoritativeness of 
the participating states, and other possible factors . . . .”). 
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Powerful states play a disproportionate role in the formation of 
bare custom.95  The influence of the powerful may be due, in part, to 
the fact that powerful states are more likely to prevail in individual 
disputes—due to the application of political or economic pressure—
and are therefore more likely to obtain favorable precedents leading 
to the conclusion that a customary rule exists.  Powerful states are also 
generally more effective at publicizing their legal positions and, indeed, 
formulating claims as legal claims in a way likely to impact custom.96   
Bare custom, then, is the product of uncoordinated or loosely co-
ordinated action that results in states coming to believe, based on each 
other’s actions, that a legal rule exists.  The powerful may be able to 
exploit such an environment to develop beneficial legal rules.   
As I explain below, codification changes the dynamic of customary 
law formation by allowing states to coordinate and commit to interpre-
tations of customary rules, without the need to do so in the context of 
particular disputes.  The basic idea behind the Capture Thesis is that 
states use treaties, and the explicit bargaining processes through which 
treaties are made, to shape customary rules in a way that works to their 
individual benefit.  More specifically, states will seek to codify cus-
tomary rules when they think codification will allow them either to 
move the customary rule in a direction favorable to their interests or 
to lock in their preferred rules to guard against future changes in the 
customary rule.   
Both powerful states and weak states may use codification.  States 
should use codification when they think the resulting customary rule 
will be more favorable to their interests than the rule resulting from 
the formation of bare custom.  Put differently, states seek to maximize 
the extent to which rules operate in their favor.  Thus, states that have 
obtained a desirable rule of bare custom may still use codification to 
improve the rule or to entrench it defensively against future changes; 
weak states may use codification to attempt to gain greater influence 
over customary rules or to resist the influence of the powerful in the 
formation of bare custom.   
Codification facilitates the development of favorable customary 
rules in two ways.  First, by framing a treaty rule as an interpretation of 
an existing customary rule, codifying states can change the calculus of 
 
95 Id. at 96.   
96 See id. at 96-97 (citing Great Britain as an example of a nation that “speaks with a 
greater authority in international law than its military position might warrant”).   
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states inclined to object to the rule’s adoption.97  Instead of simply dis-
agreeing with the proposing state, objecting states must object to the 
views and practices of all parties to the codifying treaty.  Moreover, the 
act of codifying is a commitment device.  The treaty itself is a commit-
ment by the codifying states to each other, to interpret the back-
ground customary rule in a particular way.  To disrupt the customary 
rule as interpreted in the codifying treaty, objecting or noncodifying 
states must persuade codifying states collectively to abandon their in-
terpretation of the codified rule.  In effect, codification creates a col-
lective bargaining framework.  No longer can objecting states bargain 
individually with states over the correct interpretation of the codified 
rules.  Instead, objecting states must bargain against the collective 
weight of all codifying states. 
Second, states explicitly bargain over treaty rules, whereas bargain-
ing over bare customary rules is, at best, implicit.98  States can there-
fore deploy procedural rules and bargaining tactics in treaty 
negotiations that cannot be deployed in the same fashion in the for-
mation of bare customary rules.  This is not to say that customary rules 
are not also bargained for.  The process of claiming that a particular 
state practice represents a customary rule, as opposed to merely a be-
havioral regularity, is itself a tacit bargaining process.99  But it is a pro-
cess that is relatively unstructured.  There are no firm, objectively 
verifiable rules as to precisely when a putative rule of customary inter-
national law is ripe for acceptance by states or has passed into the law. 
Not so with treaties.  International conferences can deploy a variety of 
voting rules—ranging from simple majority voting to consensus—that 
govern when the conference adopts a proposed rule.  As will be seen 
below, states can use codification as a tool to introduce explicit bargain-
ing over treaty rules when they expect the resulting rules will serve them 
better than rules emerging through the ordinary customary process. 
Seen in this light, the codification of international custom is con-
sistent with accounts of law formation in which repeat players “play for 
the rules.”100  Lawmaking processes are a battleground on which inter-
 
97 See infra subsection III.B.1. 
98 See infra Section III.C. 
99 Cf. D’AMATO, supra note 21, at 90-98 (describing a process of implicit bargaining 
the results in the formation of a customary rule).  
100 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974) (listing nine distinct advantages 
that “repeat players” have over “one-shotters” in the formation of rules through both 
rulemaking and litigation proceedings).  
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national actors—principally, but not exclusively, states—compete on 
the basis of their political and policy interests to define and interpret 
rules that will advantage them in their interactions with other actors.  
Theorizing the role of power politics in making law is important, par-
ticularly in international law, because it allows us to differentiate be-
tween law and politics.  The two are related, but they are not 
coextensive.  Previous work in international law and international rela-
tions has examined the role of power in the formation of international 
institutions,101 treaty design,102 and the choice of a treaty versus a soft 
law instrument.103  An interest-based understanding of codification—as 
the attempt by the states to define international law in a self-serving 
manner—adds to our understanding of this phenomenon.  Indeed, 
codification is of particular interest because it lies at the intersection of 
different sources of international law.  Codification exploits the over-
lap between these different sources to leverage lawmaking ability in 
ways that put even greater pressure on the already stressed consent-
based paradigm of international law. 
It is precisely this overlap that distinguishes codification from other 
manners of forum shopping.  In ordinary forum shopping, states seek 
to resolve an issue in the international forum that is most likely to yield 
the desired outcome.  Powerful states thus often seek to move particu-
larly important issues out of international bodies with broad member-
ship and equal voting into bodies with narrower memberships or 
weighted voting.104  Weak states, by contrast, seek out institutions that 
 
101 See, e.g., LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD 5-10 (2000) (putting forth a theory 
of the interplay between power politics and international institutionalization where 
“[t]he losers acquiesce because they know that the winners are in a position to proceed 
without them”). 
102 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 62, at 591-94 (discussing various motivations for in-
clusion or exclusion of different treaty design elements). 
103 See, e.g., Guzman & Meyer, supra note 19, at 197-201 (explaining how states 
choose soft, nonbinding law over hard law, including a desire for soft law when states 
can act to make “unilateral amendments” and re-coordinate expectations about what 
constitutes compliant behavior); Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 888, 917-21 (2009) (“In the decision between hard and soft law . . . power can 
be important in determining the form of a legal agreement.”); Gregory C. Shaffer & 
Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law:  Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in Interna-
tional Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 728-30 (2010) (“[T]he interaction of hard and 
soft law will be shaped primarily by the preferences of powerful states such as the Unit-
ed States and the EU . . . .”).  
104 See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes:  Political Econo-
my and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 610-12 (2007) (dis-
cussing the common practice of “serial bilateralism,” by which powerful states create 
“narrow negotiation venues as a means of limiting the ability of weaker states to form 
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favor strength in numbers.105  In both instances, rulemaking states try 
to create pressures for states excluded or marginalized in the rulemak-
ing process nevertheless to adhere to the resulting rules.  Driven by 
the need to cooperate, marginalized states accept such rules.  In effect, 
forum shopping in international lawmaking has a coercive effect when 
marginalized states would rather cooperate under a less desirable rule 
than risk a failure to cooperate.  For example, developing states joined 
the WTO after the United States and the EU withdrew from the GATT 
in 1947 because doing so was necessary to maintain most-favored na-
tion trade obligations.106 
Codification is a kind of forum shopping, insofar as states seek to 
shift international lawmaking from the relatively unstructured world of 
custom to the more highly structured world of treaties.  But codifica-
tion is also coercive in a way that most forum shopping is not.  Should 
they resist cooperation, marginalized states risk not only the sanctions 
of foregone cooperation; they also risk legal sanction for violating the 
customary rule.  Consider, for example, customary rules governing 
compensation for expropriation.  In 1938, in response to Mexico’s na-
tionalization of oil and agrarian assets, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull articulated the Hull Rule,107 which requires prompt, adequate, 
and effective compensation in the event of expropriation.108  The 
United States, as well as many developed countries, has long consid-
ered it to be the customary rule on compensation for expropriation.109  
 
countervailing coalitions”); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:  
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 86-87 
(2002) (“Rather than agree on a global standard, competing standard-setting states 
may simply opt for a ‘miniliateral’ solution . . . .”). 
105 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPs Agreement and the New Dy-
namics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6, 13-18, 53-63 
(2004) (discussing developing states’ efforts to move international intellectual property 
lawmaking away from the WTO and into more hospitable fora). 
106 Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power?  Consensus-Based Bargaining 
and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 359-360 (2002). 
107 Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before 
Bilateral Investment Treaties:  Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1560 (2009). 
108 Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment 
Treaties:  Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 52 (2008) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
109 See, e.g., SCHILL, supra note 2, at 83 (discussing modern treaty practice with re-
spect to the Hull Rule);  DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 108, at 52 (noting that de-
veloped countries tried to ensure the survival of the customary “prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation” rule by including it in BITs); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs 
Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:  Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 639, 645-46 (1998) (observing that there was international consensus sur-
Meyer FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/12/2012 4:36 PM 
1026 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 995 
In the 1970s, developing countries sought to weaken the Hull Rule 
(along with the broader international investment regime) through a 
series of U.N. General Assembly resolutions.110  In response, developed 
countries, led by the United States, began employing BITs to shore up 
the existing regime.111  Arguably, and in my view, this wave of bilateral 
codifications has solidified the Hull Rule as a rule of customary inter-
national law.112  Moreover, as I explain in greater detail later, this pro-
cess of codification has worked in the way the Capture Thesis 
suggests.113  The Hull Rule’s codification in BITs weakened the posi-
tion of states that signed the BITs and yet claimed that the customary 
rule was not the Hull Rule.  And as the number of outliers dwindled, 
the pressure on the holdouts grew.114  Despite this codification strate-
gy’s success, the recent economic downturn has caused some states to 
consider reviving the Calvo doctrine115 and thereby “renationalizing” 
investment disputes.  Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuala, for example, 
have denounced a number of their BITs.116  Argentina has been par-
ticularly active in this area.  For example, the Argentine legislature has 
considered a series of bills that would require the government to de-
nounce its international investment treaties and shift investment dis-
putes to Argentine courts. 117   Should Argentina breach its treaty 
 
rounding the Hull Rule for the first half of the twentieth century); Yackee, supra note 
107, at 1560 (explaining that since the 1930s, the United States “has insisted that the 
customary rule is and always has been” the Hull Rule). 
110 See Yackee, supra note 107, at 1550-64 (describing the resolutions passed as seek-
ing to establish the concept of “permanent sovereignty” and, ultimately, a “New Inter-
national Economic Order”). 
111 DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 108, at 52. 
112 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 20 
(2009) (“[T]hose who see investment treaties as . . . unconnected to . . . customary 
international law . . . are wrong.”). 
113 See infra Part IV. 
114 Cf. Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital:  The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 280 (arguing that as more and more capital-
importing states adopted bilateral investments, competitive pressures drove late 
adopters to sign BITs as well). 
115 The Calvo doctrine asserts that foreigners are not entitled to special privileges, 
such as the right to take investment disputes to international tribunals.  For more in-
formation on the Calvo doctrine, see Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 
123, 124-30 (2007). 
116 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
427, 469-70 (2010).   
117 See Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations:  Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy 
and Stability of International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725, 747-48 (2008) (de-
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commitments and shift international investment disputes to its nation-
al courts, and should those courts fail to apply international invest-
ment standards, Argentina would face major risks.  These risks include 
reduced foreign direct investment, reputational sanctions, and retalia-
tion from capital-exporting countries for violating the customary rules 
of international investment law.  
In the remainder of this Part, I describe the Capture Thesis more 
fully and illustrate my argument with examples.  At its core, codifica-
tion involves two or more parties applying a particular interpretation 
of a more general rule between themselves.  Rational parties imple-
menting their preferred interpretation of a rule would also prefer that 
their form become the generally applicable version of the rule.  In dip-
lomatic law, for example, two states that agree on the size limits of the 
diplomatic pouch might prefer that the customary international law 
governing the pouch also contain the same limits.  
While it is clear that states have an incentive to encourage the 
general adoption of their preferred rules, the mechanism by which 
they do so is less obvious.  Below, I explain how states can use codifica-
tion as a device to commit to a single interpretation of customary 
rules.  Codification allows groups of states that individually cannot en-
force their wills to create incentives for noncodifying states to adhere 
to the first group’s interpretations of rules, giving codifying states col-
lectively more influence than they would otherwise have individually.  
B.  Codification as Commitment 
1.  Commitment 
Earlier academic work in international law and international rela-
tions has analyzed how an individual state’s capacity to make a credible 
threat to withhold participation from an international agreement or 
organization impacts negotiations.118  When an individual state can 
impose dramatic costs on other states for failing to cooperate on its 
 
scribing three bills proposed by the Argentine legislature in 2004 and 2005 aimed at 
“limit[ing] Argentina’s participation in the international investment law system”).  
118 See, e.g., GRUBER, supra note 101, at 37 (arguing that for such a coercive negotia-
tion strategy “to be effective, ‘compellent’ threats must be credible”); Timothy Meyer, 
Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 379, 400 
(2010) (arguing that both the quality of an individual state’s outside options, other 
than an existing agreement, and its ability to make “a credible threat” to the existing 
scheme shape the course of such “renegotiation”).  
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preferred terms, it can disproportionately influence the content of 
cooperative rules.  Much of the time, however, no individual state can 
exert that kind of influence.  That is, individual states lack the ability 
to cause other states to change their views of the law simply by threat-
ening to withhold cooperation or to sanction other states for violating 
their view of customary law.  Codifying custom presents a solution to 
this difficulty, allowing groups of states to use treaties to commit them-
selves to a particular interpretation of a customary rule.  By providing 
a commitment device, codification allows groups of states to make col-
lectively credible threats to withhold cooperation from those states 
that violate the codified rule, or, at a minimum, sanction those that do 
not adopt their interpretation of a customary rule.  Using codification 
this way is particularly valuable in situations in which threats by indi-
vidual states are either incredible or unlikely to influence other states.  
In short, the collectively credible threats and sanctions that emerge 
from codified custom create incentives for noncodifying states to ad-
here to the codified interpretation of the customary rules. 
Costly commitment by codifying states to a particular interpretation 
of a rule is important because, absent such commitment, individual 
codifying states might be pressured into or inclined to strike bilateral 
arrangements that deviate from the codified interpretation.  In other 
words, codification is a bit like a Prisoners’ Dilemma.  Like-minded 
states collectively do better if they band together and adopt the same 
interpretation of customary rules against both codifying and noncodify-
ing states.  Such a commitment maximizes their ability to influence the 
behavior of noncodifying states by increasing their costs of not adher-
ing to the codified rule.  But states may also individually benefit in 
some instances from defecting from the group and applying interpreta-
tions of customary rules at odds with the codified interpretation.  Codi-
fication can solve this problem by making it costly for states to apply 
alternative versions of customary rules, even with codifying states.  
These increased costs result from several factors.  First, the very act 
of agreeing to an alternative interpretation of a customary rule preju-
dices a treaty’s effort to codify that rule.119  Since the codified custom-
 
119 This statement assumes that the codified rule and the alternative interpretation 
conflict. However, some codifying treaties provide that states may reach bilateral 
agreements containing protections in excess of the codified customary standards.  For 
example, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that states accord 
other states treatment that differs from the Convention standards where required “by 
custom or agreement.”  VCDR, supra note 38, art. 47.2(b); see also VCCR Optional Proto-
col on Disputes, supra note 76, art. 73 (“Nothing in the present Convention shall preclude 
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ary rule is valuable for codifying states in resolving future disputes, 
weakening it by providing a countervailing precedent causes harm, not 
only to the individual codifying state, but also to all codifying states.120  
This weakening leads to a second cost, namely that a codifying state 
that agrees to an alternative, weaker version of a customary rule may 
face sanctions (most likely reputational) from other treaty members. 
Codifying treaties thus can be understood to involve two separate 
promises by parties.  The first promise is to comply with the obligations 
set forth in the treaty.  The second promise—implicit in the claim that 
a treaty rule codifies custom—is to interpret the customary rule in ac-
cordance with the treaty.  Since treaty members are bound by the codi-
fied version of the customary rule with respect to one another and have 
claimed that the rule is universal by virtue of being customary, this se-
cond promise is necessarily a commitment to apply the codified version 
to nontreaty members.  Violation of this second promise—cooperating 
with a noncodifying state under an alternative understanding of a cus-
tomary rule—can therefore subject codifying states to sanctions similar 
to those they might face for violating their treaty obligations.121  
This promise not to discriminate between codifying and noncodi-
fying states in the application of a codified rule is sufficiently im-
portant that it sometimes explicitly appears in the text of agreements.  
Article 311 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, for exam-
ple, expressly precludes states parties from being “party to any agree-
ment in derogation” of the putatively customary principle of the 
 
States from concluding international agreements confirming or supplementing or ex-
tending or amplifying the provisions thereof.”).  The United States has availed itself of 
these provisions to conclude agreements granting greater immunities to its personnel 
stationed in the Soviet Union/Russia and China.  DENZA, supra note 54, at 407. 
120 Cf. D’AMATO, supra note 21, at 175-77 (arguing that “[t]he force of even a single 
precedent is magnified” in the modern world and that international law that does not 
remain constant through time may lose its significance). 
121 Similar arguments apply to nonbinding codifications such as General Assembly 
Resolutions.  See infra subsection IV.B.2.  The principle difference between nonbinding 
and binding codifications is that the sanction for deviating from nonbinding codifica-
tions will not be as strong because the level of commitment demonstrated to the codi-
fied interpretation will not be as strong.  See generally Guzman & Meyer, supra note 19 
(arguing that soft law obligations create less of an expectation of compliance and 
therefore generate lower sanctions in the event of a violation).  In principle, nonbinding 
codifications created by nonstate actors could also work in a similar fashion, although 
the inability to bind states to legal obligations may change the dynamic with nonstate 
actors somewhat.  I defer extended consideration of the role of nonstate actors to sub-
sequent work.   
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common heritage of mankind, as defined in the Convention.122  Like-
wise, the OECD’s failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment was in 
part an effort to generate a legal obligation to coordinate OECD coun-
tries in sanctioning unlawful expropriations.123  To that end, the Unit-
ed States and the EU agreed in 1998 to establish a registry of claims for 
illegally expropriated property and to apply disciplines to property 
listed on the registry.124  Finally, as discussed at greater length below, 
members of the Andean Community codified the Calvo doctrine and, 
in doing so, specifically prohibited member states from entering into 
agreements with foreign governments that accorded foreign invest-
ment treatment superior to national treatment.125 
For these reasons, members of a codifying treaty face higher costs 
for cooperating on terms other than those in the codifying treaty than 
they would have in the treaty’s absence.  These costs act as a commit-
ment device, tying treaty members to the codified version of the cus-
tomary rule.  In effect, treaty members agree to sanction one another 
 
122 UNCLOS, supra note 12, art. 311.6.  The customary status of the principle of 
common heritage is controversial.  Compare Jonathan I. Charney, The Antarctic System 
and Customary International Law (arguing that the principle of common heritage is not a 
“rule of general international law applicable to all areas outside of national jurisdic-
tion” because there is no wide consensus as to its general applicability), in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 51, 75 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2d ed. 
1996), with Rüdiger Wolfrum, Common Heritage of Mankind (arguing that “[t]he com-
mon heritage principle is part of . . . customary international law . . . providing general 
but not specific legal obligations with respect to the utilization of areas beyond nation-
al . . . jurisdiction”), in 1 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
692, 694 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).   
Similar to UNCLOS article 311.6, article 47 of the VCDR includes an obligation not 
to discriminate in the application of the Convention, subject to exceptions.  VCDR, 
supra note 38, art. 47.  By its terms, this obligation applies only to parties to the Conven-
tion.  In practice, however, the implemented legislation often makes no distinction in 
the extension of privileges between parties to the VCDR and nonparties, instead distin-
guishing on the basis of reciprocal treatment.  See DENZA, supra note 54, at 405 (noting 
that legislation in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and Belgium allows 
these countries to withdraw certain diplomatic privileges and immunities from diplo-
matic missions of countries that had not granted reciprocal privileges and immunities 
to British, Canadian, Dutch, or Belgian missions).    
123 See Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation:  The Antinomies of 
the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 731, 753-54 
(1998) (asserting that OECD countries could have used multilateral agreements “on an 
investment protection standard . . . as the basis for common action against breaches of” 
this standard).  
124 Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment 
Protection, U.S.-E.U., May 18, 1998, available at http://www.eurunion.org/partner/ 
summit/Summit9805/invest.htm.  
125 See infra Part IV.  
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for cooperating with noncodifying states on terms that conflict with 
those contained in the treaty.  This mutual sanctioning regime reduces 
the attraction of alternative rules.  Treaties thus provide signatories 
with a credible threat to sanction other treaty members for violating the 
codified customary rules and, at the extreme, to withhold cooperation 
from nontreaty members if they do not adhere to the codified rule. 
2.  Piracy and the Outlawing of the Slave Trade 
The process of outlawing the slave trade in the nineteenth century 
is an excellent example of how codifying treaties can be used as a 
commitment device.  The key state in the movement to outlaw the 
slave trade was Great Britain, the world’s premier maritime power.  
Throughout most of the eighteenth century, the British government 
had tolerated the slave trade, but the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries saw two changes in British attitudes toward the slave 
trade.  The first was the rise of an abolitionist movement based on hu-
manitarian concerns.126  The second was a change in Britain’s economic 
incentives.  American independence and the revival of slavery in Napo-
leonic France meant that two of Britain’s rivals were profiting from a 
trade that no longer benefitted Britain economically and that sections 
of British society found morally abhorrent.127  Britain thus embarked 
on a decades-long legal campaign to ban the slave trade and to devel-
op ship-boarding rights, called “visitation” rights, to enforce the ban.128 
Britain resorted to the partial codification of custom as a tech-
nique to develop a legal regime that permitted it to enforce a ban on 
the slave trade.  The codification was clearly driven by an effort to de-
fine customary law in a way that was advantageous to British interests, 
rather than simply to clarify the applicable customary rules for the sake 
of promoting cooperation.  Specifically, the consensus by the early 
nineteenth century was that the law of nations outlawed piracy.129  De-
spite this general agreement, piracy was not a clearly defined concept; 
 
126 See WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 555-56 (Michael 
Byers ed. & trans., 2000) (discussing the role humanitarian concerns played in the rise 
of British disapproval of the slave trade, but noting that these concerns were conven-
iently tied to economic changes). 
127 Id. at 556-57. 
128 See generally Michael Byers, Note, Policing the High Seas:  The Proliferation Security 
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 526, 534-36 (2004).  
129 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62 (1820) (holding 
that piracy is against the law of nations based on the universal view of the relevant 
authorities).  
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the British sought to use this ambiguity to define, through treaties, the 
slave trade as an act of piracy.130  Britain first codified such an interpre-
tation of the slave trade in an 1826 treaty with Brazil.131  The Quintuple 
Treaty of 1841—to which Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria 
were parties—declared in article 1 that engaging in the slave trade was 
an act of piracy.132  Belgium later acceded to the treaty.133  The import 
of this codification was that, if the slave trade were accepted as an act 
of piracy, slave ships would be “stateless” in the same way pirate ships 
are, and thus would be susceptible to boarding by any nation’s war-
ships—a rare exception to exclusive flag-state jurisdiction over ships 
on the high seas.  
Fearing the expansion of British naval power, the United States ac-
tively resisted the codification.  American efforts included an anony-
mous campaign in Paris to undermine French support for the 
Quintuple Treaty.134  These efforts bore fruit, as France never ratified 
the treaty.135  Ultimately, however, the United States conceded visita-
tion rights in the 1862 Treaty of Washington,136 which lead to the cus-
tomary rule’s emergence shortly thereafter.  A century later, the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the High Seas included, as a self-described 
codification of custom, boarding rights in the event that a ship is sus-
pected of engaging in the slave trade.137  Indeed, the only situations in 
which the Convention permits boarding a ship flying the flag of an-
other country (other than a situation in which the boarded ship is in 
fact of the same nationality as the warship) is when the boarded ship is 
engaged in acts of piracy or the slave trade.138 
The development of this right underscores the influence codifica-
tion of custom can have on the development of bare customs that are 
 
130 See GREWE, supra note 126, at 562. 
131 Id.  
132 Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade art. 1, Dec. 20, 1841, 92 
Consol. T.S. 437, 441. 
133 Treaty for the Accession of Belgium to the Treaty of 20 December 1841 for the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade, Feb. 28, 1848, 102 Consol. T.S. 95, 96-97. 
134 See GREWE, supra note 126, at 565 (noting that the United States “successfully in-
cited a campaign by opposition parties in France against that country’s accession to the 
Quintuple Treaty,” which included the publication of an anonymous pamphlet in Paris 
that “strongly condemned the humanitarian Polish or British claims for dominion of 
the sea”). 
135 Id. at 566.  
136 Lyons-Seward Treaty art. 1, Apr. 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 1225. 
137 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 38, art. 22.1(b). 
138 Id. 
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binding on all states.  Britain did not simply create boarding rights 
through treaty rules.  Rather, Britain employed a codification strategy 
in which it obtained treaty commitments from like-minded states to 
both grant boarding rights and interpret a bare rule of customary law 
permitting boarding of pirate ships as applying to ships engaged in the 
slave trade.  This codification had clear distributional consequences, 
given how disadvantageous it was to states still engaged in the slave 
trade.  Despite these repercussions, the British codification efforts 
played a role in pressuring holdouts, particularly the United States, to 
eventually agree that the slave trade should join piracy as an exception 
to exclusive flag-state jurisdiction.  The codification helped isolate the 
United States, so that when the pressures of the Civil War came to 
bear, the United States ultimately accepted the British-sponsored cus-
tomary rule.139  
C.  Codification and Procedural Rules 
Codification has an additional benefit for states trying to capture 
customary rules:  it allows states to use procedural bargaining tactics, 
such as agenda setting and voting rules, that are not available in the 
ordinary processes of making customary law.  These procedural devic-
es can be used either to ensure that a favorable interpretation of a cus-
tomary rule is codified, or, once a codifiying treaty exists, to create 
some measure of veto power over changes in the law.  These tactics 
are, of course, also available in noncodifying treaty negotiations.  But 
because codification is a kind of forum shopping, these tactics are par-
ticularly noteworthy.  States attempt to pick the lawmaking venue in 
which they expect to obtain the most favorable rules.  Thus, a discus-
sion of the procedural tactics available in the formation of treaties, but 
unavailable in the formation of bare custom, is worthwhile.  I discuss 
these two features of codification in turn.140  
 
139 See supra text accompanying note 136. 
140 A related argument is that treaties are superior to customary international law 
because treaties are made through democratically accountable procedures.  See John O. 
McGinnis, The Comparative Disadvantage of Customary International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 7, 9-11 (2006) (asserting that a problem of customary international law is its 
neglect of democratic decisionmaking, and listing five different democratic deficits); 
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1771-73 (2009) (arguing that “[d]omestic political actors 
cannot create norms by failing to object,” unlike in customary international law).  I do 
not address these arguments here. 
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1.  Procedure and the Codification of  
Customary Obligations 
Customary international law lacks procedural rules.  It does, of 
course, have a rule of recognition:  state practice undertaken out of a 
sense of legal obligation evidences a putative customary obligation.141  
But this differs from most rules of recognition, which tend to focus on 
agreed procedures as a way to manifest adequate consent to a legal 
obligation.142  For example, there are multiple accepted procedures on 
how states may manifest consent to a treaty, with one of the proce-
dures typically chosen for inclusion in the “Final Provisions” section of 
a treaty.  But, where customary international law is concerned, we 
know neither how individual states should convincingly demonstrate 
that their practices are done out of a sense of legal obligation, nor 
precisely how many states must act with such a sense before a custom-
ary obligation is created.  Instead, states make claims about legal 
rights, often in the context of specific disputes, while other states ob-
serve how those confrontations are resolved and react accordingly in 
their own future disputes.143 
The codification of custom allows states to escape this trap.  First, 
states can make clear that a legal obligation exists, at least as between 
the parties to the treaty.  Second, the introduction of procedural rules 
ensures that the precise rules codified are favorable to those who con-
trol the procedures of the treaty negotiations.  In other words, codifi-
cation allows states to take advantage of explicit bargaining tactics that 
are not available in the relatively unstructured world of customary law.  
These tactics include agenda setting, voting rules for adopting pro-
posed treaty terms, and exclusion.  
Agenda setting can be used to determine the precise form the cod-
ifying articles will take when they are put before a diplomatic confer-
ence for a vote.  Frequently, this is done through the preparation of 
draft articles by organizations such as the ILC.  As a formal matter, 
such draft articles do not prevent states from reopening a debate or 
conversation on any particular point if it seems worthy of negotiation.  
In practice, however, draft texts that have been negotiated in a smaller 
 
141 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 20, art. 38(1)(b). 
142 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law:  Rethinking the Doctrine of 
Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 78 (2007) (remarking that in the prevailing positivist view, 
international law is based primarily on the consent of sovereign states instead of custom).  
143 See D’AMATO, supra note 21, at 90-98 (setting forth this description and provid-
ing hypothetical cases).  
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group often have a certain inertia that resists substantial amendment.  
For example, the definition of the crime of aggression emerging from 
the Kampala Review Conference of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court in 2010 was first transmitted to the Assembly of States 
Parties from a working group in February 2009.  The working group’s 
substantive definition, which enjoyed considerable support, was adopt-
ed at the Review Conference without amendment.144 
Voting rules can be wielded to similar effect.  They can be used 
either to override a dissident minority when adopting draft articles or, 
in the case of supermajority voting, to block proposed rules that the 
minority disfavors.  Voting rules, it is important to note, are different 
from the rules governing the entry into force of treaties.  Generally, 
proposed treaty rules cannot be applied to a state as treaty rules unless 
the state individually accepts or ratifies the rules.145  The voting rules I 
refer to here are rules for adoption by a diplomatic conference.  Such 
adoption is a condition precedent to the draft articles being adopted 
as such.146  Moreover, the actions of the diplomatic conference may 
underscore or undermine any claims that the draft articles are repre-
sentative of customary law.  Thus, voting rules are critical in advancing 
or defending against a codification agenda.  
The Third U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
illustrates the importance of voting rules.  In convening UNCLOS III, 
there was considerable dispute as to what the voting rules should be.147  
Eventually, the General Assembly selected consensus as the means of 
decision, with an admonition that voting was to be a last resort, used 
only after all efforts at generating consensus had been exhausted.148  
Developing nations that wanted to ensure they could hold out for fa-
 
144 See Beth Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law:  The Crime of 
Aggression, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505, 520-21 (2011). 
145 There are exceptions to this rule, such as when a treaty permits a majority or 
supermajority to actually enact amendments to a treaty.  See Helfer, supra note 64, at 84-
86 (discussing treaties, most notably the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention 
on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, that permit majorities or supermajorities to bind 
dissenting states).   
146 States could, of course, enter into a treaty that consisted of terms rejected by a 
diplomatic conference.  
147 See MOHAMED EL BARADEI & CHLOE GAVIN, CROWDED AGENDAS, CROWDED 
ROOMS:  INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AT UNCLOS III, at 3-7 (1981) (explaining the 
terms of “the Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1973 that established the decisionmaking 
framework of UNCLOS III). 
148 Id. 
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vorable terms on seabed mining supported consensus.149  The idea was 
that consensus gave states hold-up power, thus conferring more lever-
age on otherwise weak states for the issues important to them.150  
Finally, exclusion is another tactic that states can use to bolster 
their ability to influence customary rules.  Exclusion can take several 
different forms.  For one, states may simply exclude a state from a con-
ference during which they plan to negotiate a purportedly codifying 
treaty.  This kind of exclusion is at the heart of the Capture Thesis of 
codification.  States try to use treaties as devices to create a bloc suffi-
ciently large to compel outsiders to adhere to customary rules that 
they had little say in creating.  Exclusion can take the form of negotiat-
ing a regional treaty that purports to codify customary rules, such as 
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,151 or 
inter-American agreements on the law of the sea, such as the 1952 
Santiago Declaration on the Maritime Zone,152 and the 1970 Montevi-
deo Declaration on the Law of the Sea,153 in which groups of Latin 
American states asserted exclusive jurisdiction two hundred nautical 
miles out to sea.154   
States can also exclude by concluding a series of bilateral agree-
ments that codify a favorable interpretation of customary international 
law.  By conducting a series of one-on-one negotiations, states with 
greater bargaining power may deny weaker states the opportunity to 
leverage either strength in numbers or the ability to link issues.155  
Powerful states may thus be able to obtain more advantageous codifi-
cation of legal rules.  The rise of BITs can be understood as a manifes-
tation of this kind of tactic.156  Developed countries claimed that 
customary international law requires strong protections for foreign 
 
149 Id. at 9. 
150 Id. 
151 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 
165 L.N.T.S. 19 (codifying the customary rules of statehood); see also D.J. HARRIS, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 ¶ 2 (5th ed. 1998) (observing that the 
Montevideo Convention is widely accepted as codifying the customary requirements of 
statehood).  
152 Declaration on the Maritime Zone, Aug. 18, 1952, 1006 U.N.T.S. 325. 
153 Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 1081. 
154 See INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 58-64 (Nigel S. Rodley & 
C. Neale Ronning eds., 1974) (detailing the history of seabed agreements between 
Latin American countries). 
155 See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 104, at 611 (noting the increased frequency 
of “serial bilateralism” by large states in areas of “vital interest”).  
156 See supra text accompanying notes 110-17. 
Meyer FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/12/2012 4:36 PM 
2012] Codifying Custom 1037 
investment, and in particular “prompt, adequate and effective” compen-
sation in the event of expropriation.  These claims were weakened by 
Resolution 3201’s New International Economic Order (NIEO).157  Thus, 
developed countries turned to bilateral negotiations as a form of exclu-
sive rulemaking.158  
This second kind of exclusion better reflects how multilateral ne-
gotiations actually happen.  Large multilateral conferences rarely in-
volve all states present actually negotiating over the text of the 
agreement.  The transaction costs of such a negotiation would be so 
large that reaching an agreement would likely be unworkable.159  In-
stead, primary negotiations are generally delegated to working groups, 
committees, or individual states.160  Exclusion from a key working 
 
157 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. 
Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9959 (1974). 
158 For a discussion of the fall of the Hull rule’s “prompt, adequate and effective” 
standard and the subsequent rise of the BIT, see generally Guzman, supra note 109, at 
646-56.  Guzman’s claims that the Hull Rule was custom prior to the NIEO, but was 
then demolished by it, have both been criticized as incorrect.  That is, some believe 
there was no customary law to be demolished, and others believe the customary law in 
question both existed and survived the NIEO’s challenge.  Compare Jeswald W. Salacuse 
& Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?:  An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 68 (2005) (characterizing post–World 
War II customary investment law as “an ephemeral structure consisting largely of scat-
tered treaty provisions, a few questionable customs, and contested general principles of 
law”), and Yackee, supra note 107, at 1565 & n.66 (discussing and citing scholars who 
“argue quite plausibly that customary international law has never fully reflected the 
Hull formulation”), with Alvarez, supra note 112, at 39 (“[T]he traditional customary 
rules of state responsibility, including the international minimum standard, were not 
displaced by some [developing countries’] efforts to establish the NIEO.”).  For my 
purposes, it is enough that the developed world claims that NIEO undermined custom-
ary investment rules, prompting them to engage in codification.  Given the indetermi-
nacy of legal rules, the strength of claims during negotiations about what legal rules 
require is more important than the binary distinctions that tribunals make about 
whether a law exists and covers the challenged conduct.  
159 See Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International 
Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 351 (2008) (“The introduction of additional parties to 
treaty negotiations is hardly ever cost-free.  It potentially increases barriers to efficient 
agreements and exacerbates problems of information asymmetry, strategic barriers, 
psychological barriers, and institutional constraints.”).   
160 See id. at 351-52 (reporting that the “real negotiation” at Bretton Woods was a bi-
lateral U.S.-U.K. negotiation).  For this reason, the use of membership in a treaty negoti-
ation as a proxy for transaction costs is imperfect.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Reinventing 
Lisbon:  The Case for a Protocol to the Lisbon Agreement (Geographical Indications), 11 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 67, 120 (2010) (“A massive addition of new members to the Lisbon system 
would naturally entail administrative obligations . . . .”).  While transaction costs cer-
tainly do increase with new members, the marginal increase in transaction costs proba-
bly falls as the overall number of members rises.  
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group or committee can therefore be tantamount to a near total ex-
clusion from the negotiations.  Moreover, in negotiations that cover a 
large number of issues, resource limitations may effectively exclude 
some states from negotiating across the full range of concerns.161  A 
state excluded from negotiations does, of course, have the opportunity 
to vote on the final product and may in some instances have influence 
through friendly nations on the committee.  Moreover, every state re-
tains the ability not to ratify the treaty.  But exclusion from negotia-
tions reduces a state’s influence over the content of the proposed 
agreement.  
Although examples of the use of committees are legion, UNCLOS 
III again illustrates the dynamic.  At UNCLOS III, there were three 
main committees, each a committee of the whole, meaning that all 
represented parties were present.162  However, negotiations with all 
states present proved unwieldy.  Committee I, the most contentious 
committee, was pared down into a working group with ten developed 
nations, ten developing nations, and China.163  Committee II, which 
dealt with traditional law-of-the-sea issues, also had private working 
groups, including one convened to address the exclusive economic 
zone.164  While creating a working group has an efficiency rationale 
because it speeds up negotiations, it also privileges the input of states 
actually in the working group.  Moreover, at least one participant in 
the UNCLOS III negotiations indicated that the negotiations were so 
sprawling, and the issues so numerous, that only a few of the most well-
staffed delegations were able to track and effectively participate in the 
entire set of negotiations.165 
 
161 See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 977 (2011) 
(noting that countries with limited resources “may not have the ability to dedicate ef-
forts to normmaking in a multitude of competing fora”). 
162 EL BARADEI & GAVIN, supra note 147, at 14-15. 
163 Id. at 19.  
164 See Erik Franckx, The 200-Mile Limit:  Between Creeping Jurisdiction and Creeping 
Common Heritage?:  Some Law of the Sea Considerations from Professor Louis Sohn’s Former 
LL.M. Student, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 467, 470 n.6 (2007) (noting the efforts of 
two prominent ambassadors to form a “private negotiating group . . . competent to 
deal . . . with the [exclusive economic zone]”).  
165 See EL BARADEI & GAVIN, supra note 147, at 11 (explaining the pragmatic diffi-
culties of “[t]he package deal and consensus” voting in UNCLOS III negotiations).  
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2.  Procedure in the Amendment of Codified  
Customary Obligations 
Another advantage (or possible disadvantage) of the treaty mech-
anism is that treaties, unless they contain clauses to the contrary, can 
only be amended through the treaty-making process.166  But precisely 
because customary international law lacks clear procedural rules gov-
erning its creation, its evolution is much more fluid.  Treaties, by con-
trast, generally create veto points for amending treaty rules.  Unless a 
treaty specifies otherwise, a state will not be bound by an amendment 
without its affirmative consent.167  It is therefore potentially easier to 
disrupt a pure rule of custom than to amend a treaty rule.  Codifica-
tion thus has the potential to slow down the development of custom,168 
and, more importantly, to endow states that are parties to a codifying 
treaty with a veto on a rule’s repeal. 
In large part, the increased difficulty in changing codified custom-
ary rules stems from the fact that a greater number of states must, as a 
matter of procedure, weigh in on the change in the law.  Where bare 
customary rules are concerned, the number of states participating in 
the formation or change of a customary rule may, by necessity, be lim-
ited to those few states particularly interested in the rule.  By contrast, 
if the rule has been codified in a large multilateral treaty, under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties each party will have to de-
cide whether to accept the new rule.169  In that context, rejections of an 
amendment to a customary rule could defeat the effort to change the 
codified customary rule.170  Thus, treaty-amendment procedures can 
force greater participation in the customary lawmaking process, poten-
tially to the detriment of custom’s ability to evolve. 
 
166 See Joel R. Paul, The Rule of Law Is Not for Everyone, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1046, 
1052 (2006) (book review) (“[T]he Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
that the parties to a treaty are bound to it unless they act in conformity with the treaty 
to amend its express terms.”). 
167 See VCLT, supra note 38, art. 40 (“The amending agreement does not bind any 
State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending 
agreement.”). 
168 See Grover, supra note 78, at 570 (arguing that codification may have the effect 
of “freezing the development of customary international law by ‘photographing’ the 
law at a moment in time”).  
169 VCLT, supra note 38, art. 40. 
170 See Grover, supra note 78, at 570 (arguing that the static, coded nature of rules 
may stifle “the natural growth of international criminal law”).  
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To be sure, this veto power is not absolute.  Codified customary 
rules can continue to evolve outside of the codifying treaty.171  Even 
treaties that codify customary international law sometimes include 
clauses meant to preserve custom’s ability to evolve outside of the trea-
ty process.  For example, article 10 of the Rome Statute states, “Noth-
ing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any 
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes oth-
er than this Statute.”172  Such statements are meant to preserve space 
for customary rules to evolve outside of a treaty regime that codifies 
then-existing custom, although it is unclear how successful these 
statements are in preventing an understanding of the customary rule 
from coalescing around the treaty rule.  To take but one example, the 
Nuremberg Tribunal applied the 1907 Hague Convention on the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land to defendants as customary international 
law despite the fact that the Convention contains a si omnes clause that 
states, “The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Ar-
ticle 1, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except be-
tween Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are 
parties to the Convention.”173  The Judgment of the Tribunal on this 
point rested explicitly on the fact that the Hague Convention sought 
 
171 See Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law:  The Problem of Treaties, 21 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 11 (1988) (noting that the importance of state practice to 
international legal obligations means that treaties cannot freeze customary law simply 
by codifying it). 
172 Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 10.  The adoption of the definition of the 
crime of aggression was similarly qualified by interpretive understandings, which the 
United States designed with the goal of “undermin[ing] any tendency to refer to these 
definitions as evidence of the progressive development of customary international law.”  
Beth Van Schaack, “The Grass That Gets Trampled When Elephants Fight”:  Will the Codifica-
tion of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forth-
coming 2012) (manuscript at 32 n.179).  This effort was itself undermined by the fact 
that the United States proposed to include an explicit reference to “customary interna-
tional law” in the “understandings” and was rebuffed.  See Beth Van Schaack, Understand-
ing Aggression I, INTLAWGRRLS ( Jun. 24, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.intlawgrrls.com/ 
2010/06/understanding-aggression.html (reviewing and discussing the debate over the 
interpretive “understandings” that occurred in advance of the ICC Kampala Confer-
ence on May 31, 2010). 
173 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention] (consuming the applicability of 
Article I’s mandate to issue orders to respect the regulations and customary law). 
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to codify international humanitarian law by “revis[ing] the general 
laws and customs of war.”174   
Another way codifications can avoid stunting the development of 
custom is through the interpretation of a codifying provision as refer-
encing existing customary law at the time the provision is applied, ra-
ther than the body of customary law from the time the treaty was 
adopted.  Arbitral tribunals have taken this view when deciding in-
vestment disputes under both BITs and the investment chapters of 
regional free trade agreements.  In applying the international mini-
mum standard of treatment—the level of treatment that foreign inves-
tors are entitled to as a matter of international law—or the fair and 
equitable treatment obligation as part of that standard, tribunals un-
der the relevant treaties have repeatedly held that the standard is 
evolving and should be applied as it exists at the time of the dispute.175  
In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, for example, Canada argued that Neer v. 
Mexico, a 1920s arbitration, dictated the international minimum stand-
ard of treatment.  Neer held that the international minimum standard 
was breached by treatment that “amount[ed] to an outrage, to bad 
faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental 
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and 
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.”176  The Pope 
tribunal found, however, that the customary standard had evolved 
since the 1920s and that NAFTA article 1105 required application of 
the evolving, rather than the 1920s, standard.177 
 
174 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 
1946 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 173, pmbl.) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 248-49 (1947). 
175 See, e.g., BG Grp. Plc. v. Argentina, Final Award, ¶ 302 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 
2007), http://italaw.com/documents/BG-award_000.pdf (finding that the minimum 
standard is not fixed in time); Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ¶ 194 
(NAFTA UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/Thunderbird 
Award.pdf (condoning treating the minimum standard as evolving law); KENNETH J. 
VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:  HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 
194, 228-29 (2010) (describing arbitration decisions that found an evolving standard of 
treatment).  But see Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 21 (NAFTA UNCITRAL 
Arb. Trib. 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Glamis_Award.pdf (agreeing that “fair 
and equitable treatment” remains subject to the standard articulated in Neer v. Mexico, 4 
R.I.A.A. 60 (U.S.-Mex. Gen Cl. Comm’n 1926), but suggesting that the standard has 
evolved over time). 
176 Neer, 4 R.I.A.A. at 61-62.  
177 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 118 (NAFTA Arb. 
Trib. 2001), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf 
(rejecting Canada’s argument for the standard of egregious conduct Neer would re-
quire); see also Tecnicas Medicambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, IC-
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D.  Treaty Membership 
Thus far I have shown how the codification of custom allows 
groups of states to band together and credibly sanction noncodifying 
states for failing to adhere to a codified version of customary rules.  
What, though, are the constraints on this practice? 
The chief constraint on using codification to control the back-
ground customary rule is the requirement of a minimum level of par-
ticipation in the codifying treaty.178  Ultimately, to successfully induce 
noncodifying states to adhere to the codified rules, the treaty must have 
enough members to make nonadherence unattractive.  Large member-
ships in codifying treaties necessarily increase the cost of nonadherence 
for noncodifying states in two ways.  First, as membership grows, non-
adhering states will be brought into conflict with an increasing num-
ber of codifying states because codifying states may choose to withhold 
reciprocal benefits from nonadhering states.  At a minimum, the 
transaction costs of cooperation between these states will rise, as the 
codified rule will provide no default rule for cooperation.  More codi-
fying states mean more of these costly relationships for nonadhering 
states, thereby making adherence more attractive.  
Second, as codifying states unify their interpretation of the underly-
ing customary rule, the potential for reputational sanctions for nonad-
hering states rises.  All else equal, more states holding the same view of 
what custom requires will increase the reputational sanctions for those 
who do not comply with that view of custom.  Thus, nonadhering 
states are faced with the transaction costs presented by trying to coop-
erate with codifying states, as well as additional reputational sanctions 
if they fail to adhere.  
Although a larger number of codifying states should increase the 
number of noncodifying states that adhere to the treaty, increasing the 
number of codifying states is not costless.  There are at least two signif-
icant drawbacks to expanding the number of codifying states:  increased 
transaction costs and dilution of the rules agreed to in the treaty.  
 
SID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 116 (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (noting that 
international law is not “frozen in time”); Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States of Am., 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 125 (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 
(2004) (finding that customary law refers to law as “it stands no earlier than the time at 
which NAFTA came into force”).  
178 See Blum, supra note 159, at 359-61 (discussing the minimum effective coalition 
necessary to sustain cooperation); see also Helfer, supra note 64, at 98-100 (arguing that 
problem structure affects the minimum number of states whose participation is re-
quired to sustain cooperation).   
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First, increasing the number of parties to a negotiation is com-
monly thought to increase the transaction costs involved in the negoti-
ation.179  As more parties become involved, the act of negotiating 
becomes more costly because more time is necessary for each state to 
set out its positions, make its proposals, and define its views on other 
states’ proposals.180  Moreover, a larger number of parties can make it 
more difficult to control the agenda, increasing the likelihood of cy-
cling among alternatives and the resulting delays.  These increased 
transaction costs affect the probability of reaching an agreement.  
Costlier negotiations mean a greater likelihood that bargaining will 
break down or that states will be deterred from opening negotiations 
in the first place.181  Transaction costs also reduce the cooperative sur-
plus created in the event an agreement is reached.182  
Second, scholars have recognized that there is a tradeoff between 
the breadth of an agreement’s membership and the depth of its sub-
stantive terms.183  More specifically, when the standard of conduct re-
quired by a proposed rule does not vary among states, an increase in 
the number of states participating in the negotiations may dilute the 
standard of conduct upon which those states can agree.184  The reason 
for this tradeoff is rather straightforward.  Under any given rule of de-
cision (e.g., majority rule, supermajority, unanimity), there is a mar-
ginal vote that is necessary to bring the proposed rule into force.  The 
proposed standard of conduct thus must be set at a level that attracts 
that marginal vote.  As more states become party to the vote, more votes 
become necessary to implement a proposed rule.  And as state prefer-
ences become more heterogeneous, the proposed rule must be diluted 
to attract additional votes up until the point at which the rule attracts 
the marginal vote necessary to bring the rule into force.185   
 
179 See, e.g., Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 549, 551 (2005) (noting that involving more states in negotiations may 
make the negotiations last longer than those between fewer states).  
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 551-52. 
182 Id. 
183 See, e.g., Michael J. Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-Off in International Mul-
tilateral Agreements?, 58 INT’L ORG. 459, 461 (2004); Helfer, supra note 64, at 92.  
184 Gilligan, supra note 183, at 461-62. 
185 See id. at 462-63 (creating a model to predict required levels of dilution).  
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As an example, a state must generally consent to a treaty before it 
can be bound by it.186  The decisional rule to bind all necessary parties 
is therefore unanimity.187  Unanimity becomes a considerably more 
imposing requirement in negotiations as the number of states increas-
es because the diversity of objections to stringent standards is likely to 
expand as well.  That is, larger groups of necessary parties are likely to 
have a greater diversity of preferences, making distributional conflicts 
more severe.188  To accommodate objecting states, the proposed stand-
ard has to be diluted or made vague so that a variety of actions can be 
considered compliant. 
The negotiation of the definition of the crime of aggression in the 
Rome Statute illustrates the costs of expanded membership.  While 
there is general consensus that “aggression” is contrary to customary 
international law, there is strong disagreement about what specifically 
constitutes the crime of aggression.189  The major fault line in the ne-
gotiations was how much of a gap there should be between an “act” of 
aggression and a “crime” of aggression.190  One group of states wanted 
 
186 See VCLT, supra note 38, arts. 34-37 (explaining when treaties may be binding on 
third states).  
187 There are a variety of ways for states to soften the unanimity rule, such as em-
powering diplomatic conferences to adopt draft articles with less than unanimous sup-
port or allowing a treaty to come into force upon some minimum number of 
ratifications.  See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 63, 14-34 (discussing several modes of creat-
ing nonunanimous international agreements).  Although these devices allow proposed 
treaty obligations to advance, they do not alter the fundamental unanimity rule im-
posed by the consent doctrine—to be bound, a state must consent.  See id. at 14-15.  
Treaties frequently recognize the significance of individual states by making either 
particular states’ ratification or ratification by states engaged in a minimum percentage 
of the regulated activity a condition precedent to the treaty’s entry into force.  See, e.g., 
Protocol to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
art. 5, para. 1, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 (providing that the Convention “shall 
enter into force twelve months after the date on which not less than fifteen States, the 
combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than fifty per cent of the gross 
tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping, have become Parties to it”).  
188 Of course, a large group of like-minded states will be able to agree on “deep” 
standards of conduct more easily than a small group in which there is a diversity of 
interests.  Most treaties, however, begin with a state or group of states pushing for a 
resolution to a problem.  As the number of states necessary to ratify that resolution 
expands, it becomes increasingly likely that the additional states will diverge in prefer-
ences from the original group.  For this reason, it makes sense to think about the 
breadth-versus-depth tradeoff as related to the number of parties to a treaty.  
189 See BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS ENFORCEMENT:  CASES AND MATERIALS 347 (2007).  
190 See Van Schaack, supra note 144, at 522-23 (illustrating how the definitions of 
acts and crimes of aggression were “open to endless interpretation” as a result of a 
compromise in language struck by the two principal factions).  
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no separation; every act of aggression could be prosecuted as a crime 
of aggression.191  A second group of states advocated a higher standard, 
seeking to limit the crime of aggression to “flagrant” breaches of the 
U.N. Charter, wars of aggression, and “unlawful” uses of force or acts 
of aggression geared toward occupying or annexing territory.192 
Instead, a standard of “manifest” violation of the U.N. Charter was 
adopted.  The term was adopted precisely because it is indeterminate:  
it allowed states to resolve a serious distributional conflict with a vague 
standard that avoided clarifying the law in a way that benefitted one 
side or the other.  This need to compromise on ambiguous language 
resulted from the fact that the voting rules on adopting amendments 
required a near unanimous vote at the Kampala Conference.  Specifi-
cally, the rules on amendments required that for an amendment to be 
adopted, two-thirds of the full membership of the Rome Statute vote 
in favor.193  At the time, the Rome Statute had 111 members, requiring 
seventy-four votes to adopt any amendments.194  Initially, the Creden-
tials Committee indicated that only seventy-two states had presented 
credentials entitling them to vote, although during the conference 
some maneuvering increased that number to eighty-five.195  Thus, while 
unanimity was not strictly required, only a small number of defections 
could occur before the adoption of amendments would not be possi-
ble.  In short, expanded membership, coupled with the voting rules at 
the Review Conference, introduced greater distributional conflict and 
made adopting a clearer definition of aggression impossible. 
E.  Conclusion 
This Part has described how codification can be used to capture 
customary rules and the limits on that practice.  Specifically, codifica-
tion allows a group of like-minded states to commit to a single inter-
pretation of a disputed customary rule.  Codifying the treaty raises the 
 
191 See ICC, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess., Special Working Grp. on the Crime 
of Aggression, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, ¶ 18, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1 (Nov. 23–Dec. 6, 2006), available at http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ICC-ASP-5- SWGCA-INF1_English.pdf.  
192 See id. ¶¶ 18-20. 
193 Van Schaack, supra note 144, at 518.  
194 Id.  
195 See id. (“Additional states submitted ‘information concerning the appointment 
of representatives,’ bringing the number of potential voting states up to 85 . . . .” (quot-
ing Valerie Oosterveld, Final Day in Kampala, INTLAWGRRLS ( June 11, 2010), http:// 
www.intlawgrrls.com/2010/06/final-day-in-kampala.html)).  
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costs of applying alternative versions of codified rules to noncodifying 
parties.  This, in turn, raises the cost to noncodifying states of refusing 
to adhere to codified rules they may have played little role in forming.  
By refusing to adhere, noncodifying states risk being unable to coop-
erate with codifying states and being sanctioned for violating the cus-
tomary obligation as codified.  Moreover, codification can allow states 
to deploy explicit bargaining tactics that are unavailable in the un-
structured environment in which bare rules of custom are formed.  
This practice is constrained, on the one hand, by the need to include a 
minimum number of states in order to create sufficient incentives to 
pressure noncodifying states to adhere to the codified rule.  On the 
other hand, states wish to include no more states than necessary in the 
codification process to avoid the dilution of the codified rule that can 
result from broader participation in negotiations. 
IV.  RAMIFICATIONS 
In this Part, I discuss the most important ramifications of the Cap-
ture Thesis.  First, I argue that codified customary rules will often be 
Pareto inferior to uncodified custom because codification can be used 
to capture the content of customary legal rules.  This result is highly 
counterintuitive because states must consent to be bound by a treaty, 
suggesting that a codifying treaty should be Pareto improving.  Se-
cond, and more importantly, the fact that codification can be used to 
capture customary rules increases the fragmentation of international 
law.  Codification increases fragmentation by creating an incentive for 
states to codify their own preferred interpretation of customary rules.  
In other words, groups of states with different interpretations each 
have an incentive to codify their own interpretations.  Multiple codifi-
cation efforts increase fragmentation by entrenching disagreements 
about what custom requires along regional or ideological lines.  Codi-
fication can thus have precisely the opposite of its intended effect.  
Rather than unifying customary law, codification can actually create 
deeper interpretative divisions. 
A.  Suboptimal Rules 
One of the central questions about customary international law, as 
with other forms of decentralized law, is whether it evolves toward effi-
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ciency.196  Professor Eugene Kontorovich, for example, has argued that 
customary international law is unlikely to evolve toward efficiency be-
cause states do not share the attributes of a community likely to pro-
duce efficient norms.197  In the international context, codification 
could in theory offer a way to ensure that customary law evolves toward 
efficiency.  As Professor Kontorovich says, “Treaties are presumably 
welfare maximizing under the demanding Pareto criterion:  they have 
the unanimous consent of the parties to the treaty, and thus presuma-
bly make all parties better off.”198  Put differently, norms that evolve 
through contractual mechanisms, such as treaties, might have a pre-
sumption of Pareto superiority that should not be accorded to cus-
tomary norms not explicitly bargained for. 
Contrary to the presumption that consent ensures that codifying 
treaties are Pareto-improving relative to bare custom, I argue that codi-
fied custom will often be Pareto inferior to bare custom.  The difficulty 
with attaching a presumption of Pareto superiority to codifying treaties 
is that doing so minimizes the role of power in bargaining.  Specifical-
ly, while voluntary agreements are presumptively Pareto improving, 
that need not mean that they are Pareto improving relative to the sta-
tus quo, bare custom.  Instead, powerful states or groups of states will 
often have the ability to define another state’s options by threatening 
to withhold cooperation or by sanctioning states for failing to comply 
with the more powerful states’ preferred interpretation of a customary 
rule.  States with a credible threat to withhold cooperation or penalize 
nonconformance have the ability to take the status quo off the table.  
In such situations, a treaty need not be Pareto superior to the status 
quo; it only needs to be Pareto superior to the alternative, which may 
 
196 See Todd J. Zywicki & Edward Peter Stringham, Common Law and Economic Effi-
ciency (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-43, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673968 (reviewing the literature on whether the 
common law evolves toward efficiency).  
197 See Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 859, 889-94 (2006) (offering a list of circumstances under which a community is 
most likely to develop efficient norms—such as small group size and frequent group 
member interaction—and subsequently arguing that international states do no possess 
such attributes).  
198 Id. at 903.  Despite this concern, Professor Kontorovich does not believe that 
codified customs are any more efficient than bare customs because treaties often create 
new rules that are merely called custom.  See id. at 904.  Treaties have no expectation of 
enforcement, and thus there are no additional costs to codifying inefficient customary 
rules.  Treaties are rarely global in the way that customary law is, and even codifying 
treaties usually contain new rules, such that a deal might be struck to codify inefficient 
rules of custom in exchange for Pareto-improving new rules.  Id. at 903-04. 
Meyer FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/12/2012 4:36 PM 
1048 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 995 
be no cooperation at all, cooperation under an even less desirable set 
of rules, or cooperation with a sanction for violating the powerful 
states’ understanding of custom.199  It follows from this logic that pow-
erful states or groups of states have the ability to codify interpretations 
of customary rules that are Pareto inferior to a status quo interpreta-
tion or to the views of weak states.  
The following example illustrates how a codified customary rule 
can be Pareto inferior to preexisting bare customary rules:  the exemp-
tion from taxation enjoyed by the “premises” of a diplomatic mission, 
codified in article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions (VCDR).200  The exemption from taxation of the mission’s prem-
ises was not a customary rule in the nineteenth century, but by the 
1930s, a number of foreign ministries and courts appeared to accept 
the exemption as a customary rule.201  In 1969, after the VCDR and the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) had entered into 
force—but before the United States was a party to either treaty—the 
State Department argued during litigation that customary internation-
al law required exempting consular mission premises in New York 
from taxation.202  The New York Court of Appeals adopted the State 
Department’s position, suggesting that the exemption had hardened 
into a customary rule no later than its codification in those two trea-
ties.203  Thus, in codifying the rule on tax exemptions for mission prem-
ises, codifying states also changed the rule to require exemption where 
the status quo rule had not.  
 
199 See Meyer, supra note 118, at 393-94 (discussing different treaty provisions that 
“affect a state’s legal ability to exit an agreement,” including conditional rights to exit 
and imposition of “costly bargaining procedures on would-be exiters”). 
200 See VCDR, supra note 119, art. 23 (“The sending State and the head of the mis-
sion shall be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect 
of the premises of the mission . . . .”).  
201 See DENZA, supra note 54, at 151-52 (discussing the Canadian and American ac-
ceptance of the exemption as a customary rule).  
202 See Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 700 (N.Y. 1969) 
(“The Department of State is of the opinion that under recognized principles of inter-
national law and comity the several states of the United States, as well as their political 
subdivisions, should not assess taxes against foreign government-owned property used 
for public noncommercial purposes.” (quoting Letter from Richard D. Kearney, Acting 
Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to the Comptroller of the City of N.Y. (Sept. 2, 1965)) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
203 See id. at 701 (describing a provision in the VCCR similar to article 23 of the 
VCDR as “codifying or declaring existing law” and “intended to reflect the rules to 
which nations generally conform”).  
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States reciprocally apply the exemption on taxation of mission 
premises, such that the exemption both benefits and burdens each 
state.  The precise benefits and burdens, however, depend on the 
amount of property a government owns abroad that qualifies as “prem-
ises of the mission” within the meaning of the codified customary rule.  
Exemptions favor states with large diplomatic corps.  Under a regime 
with no exemption, those states would be net payers of taxes.  States 
with small diplomatic corps would be net recipients of tax receipts.  
That is, they would have to pay taxes on their relatively few, small mis-
sions abroad but could tax the relatively large number of missions they 
host.  Codifying a rule requiring tax exemption for mission premises 
therefore worked an almost entirely distributional change in custom-
ary law.  Tax receipts were reallocated from governments with small 
diplomatic corps to those with large diplomatic corps.  Because some 
states lost tax receipts, this change by definition is not Pareto superior 
to the status quo rule that permitted but did not require exemption. 
Nor is there any doubt that states themselves think of the codified 
customary rule in precisely these terms.  The public record from a re-
cent dispute over the taxation of permanent missions to the United 
Nations makes clear that states do indeed view the codified customary 
rule as principally distributional.  City of New York v. Permanent Mission 
of India to the United Nations presented the question of whether resi-
dences for mission staff located on the same property as clearly tax-
exempt office space were themselves tax-exempt “premises of the mis-
sion.”204  New York City initially filed suit against a number of foreign 
missions, including India’s, seeking a declaratory judgment to validate 
millions of dollars in tax liens against the foreign missions.205  The mis-
sions, for their part, claimed that the exemption for staff residences is 
required by the customary rule codified in article 23 of the VCDR.206  
Specifically, the VCDR defines the premises of the mission as “the 
buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, 
 
204 618 F.3d 172, 174-75, 197 (2d Cir. 2010). 
205 Id. at 175-76.  A related issue on the jurisdictional immunities of foreign states 
was recently decided by the International Court of Justice.  See Jurisdictional Immunities 
of the State (Ger. v. It.), ¶ 107 (Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/files/143/16883.pdf (upholding Germany’s immunity under international law 
from judgments against it rendered by Italian courts). 
206 See Permanent Mission of India, 618 F.3d at 177; see also Republic of Argentina, 250 
N.E.2d at 700 n.2 (“In view of the many consulates and other government offices which 
it maintains abroad, the United States unquestionably has a real interest in having the 
court find that such property is immune from taxation under international law.”). 
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used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the 
head of the mission.”207  Consistent with state practice that generally 
accorded such residences tax exemption, the missions maintained 
that mission staff residences were indeed “used for purposes of the 
mission/consulate.”208  
The case went to the Supreme Court and, on remand, the State De-
partment intervened to “resolv[e] a dispute” that it called “a major irri-
tant in the United States’ bilateral relations [that] threatens to cost the 
United States hundreds of millions of dollars in reciprocal taxation.”209  
As the State Department explained in its determination granting tax-
exempt status to residences of staff of missions to the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States, “As the largest foreign-
government property owner overseas, the United States benefits finan-
cially much more than other countries from an international practice 
exempting staff residences from real property taxes, and it stands to 
lose the most if the practice is undermined.”210  Simply put, the State 
Department publicly justified the tax exemption for mission premises 
as a distributional issue.  The exemption benefits the United States 
implicitly at the expense of other states that lose the benefit of tax re-
ceipts from countries—like the United States and, perhaps, India—
that have large diplomatic corps.  In other words, the United States 
accepted that the tax-exempt status of diplomatic property crystallized 
by the VCDR and the VCCR is not a Pareto superior improvement over 
the rule permitting but not requiring exemption.211  At best, the rule 
simply redistributed the gains from cooperation to powerful states and 
possibly reduced overall welfare in the process. 
The fact that power and its application in procedural settings that 
magnify the influence of certain actors can interfere with the evolution 
of customary law toward efficiency is a familiar result.  Repeat players, 
for example, can strategically litigate in ways that cause the law to 
 
207 VCDR, supra note 38, art. 1(i). 
208 See Permanent Mission of India, 618 F.3d at 175; see also Designation and Determi-
nation under the Foreign Missions Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,788, 31,788 ( July 2, 2009) (dis-
cussing the state practice of granting residences exemption from taxation and 
designating it as a benefit under the Foreign Missions Act). 
209 Permanent Mission of India, 618 F.3d at 178. 
210 74 Fed. Reg. at 31,788. 
211 The dispute in Permanent Mission of India involved the tax-exempt status of a 
permanent mission to the United Nations, 618 F.3d at 175, a slightly different question 
than the tax-exempt status of diplomatic missions.  Nevertheless, the broader point 
about the effect of tax exemptions remains the same. 
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evolve to reflect their interests, regardless of whether such self-interest-
driven law is efficient.212  Understanding how international law is sub-
ject to the same self-interested pressures is important in evaluating the 
normative desirability of particular rules and rule-making processes.  
In particular, the finding that the consent paradigm does not actually 
protect states from changes in the law that make them individually 
worse off further undercuts the normative support for retaining a 
strong consensual requirement in international law. 
B.  Fragmentation 
Codification creates an incentive for noncodifying states to adhere 
to codified customary rules.  It therefore becomes a tool to make in-
ternational law without the consent, or at least the direct participation, 
of other states.  Despite the drawbacks of codification—in particular 
the lack of participation by noncodifying states and the possibility of 
suboptimal rules becoming universal—there is at least one potential 
benefit to using codification to, effectively, legislate:  international law 
will be harmonized, with a single standard prevailing over multiple 
standards.  Codification, then, can aid cooperation by solving a coor-
dination problem.  In essence, this is the Clarification Thesis.  
Unfortunately, the very fact that codification can entrench a par-
ticular interpretation of customary law, but that international law does 
not locate the authority to codify in any single institution, undercuts 
codification’s value as a coordination device.  Instead, the fact that 
codification can change noncodifying states’ behavior creates incen-
tives for groups of states to engage in diverging codification efforts in 
an attempt to entrench each group’s own preferred version of a cus-
tomary rule.  These multiple codifications—a species of what has been 
termed “fragmentation”213—dramatically increase the cost of coordina-
tion going forward, which is even worse than simply leading to the 
breakdown of coordination on a single legal standard.  Moreover, com-
peting codification efforts will often be linked to broader disagree-
 
212 See Albiston, supra note 47, at 870 (noting that repeat players can control the 
outcome of rules due to “unequal resources” and “greater strategic knowledge”); Choi 
& Gulati, supra note 47, at 1152 (noting that in the case of boilerplate contract litiga-
tion, “the resources of the specific parties are unlikely to match the resources of the 
group of all contracting parties,” and that the resources and abilities of the particular 
repeat litigant weigh heavily in the court’s determination of which position to adopt).  
213 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 
2006, ¶ 242-45, U.N. Doc A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) (describing 
the phenomenon of fragmentation in international law and the challenge it poses). 
Meyer FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/12/2012 4:36 PM 
1052 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 995 
ments about both the content and the appropriate role of international 
law.  Multiple codifications therefore will tend to exacerbate regional 
and ideological tensions in international law and international relations.  
Fragmentation—“the emergence of specialized and (relatively) au-
tonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of 
legal practice”214—is a concept that has occasioned much debate in the 
international legal community.215  On the one hand are those who 
have lauded fragmentation as an indication of the increasing relevance 
of international law.216  In particular, fragmentation is thought to en-
courage pluralistic legal dialogue.  Professor William Burke-White has 
argued that “an increasingly loud interjudicial dialogue . . . . provides 
actors at all levels with means to communicate, share information, and 
possibly resolve potential conflicts before they even occur.”217  Addi-
tionally, Professor Kal Raustiala has argued that transnational networks 
of government officials can support the effectiveness of, and compli-
ance with, treaties through similar cooperative dynamics, as well as the 
“regulatory export” of “rules and practices from major powers to 
weaker states.”218 
On the other hand are those worried that fragmentation “may 
jeopardize the unity of international law and, as a consequence, its 
 
214 Id. ¶ 143. 
215 See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II:  Our Fragmenting 
Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1843566 (seeking the “root causes of fragmenta-
tion” in an effort “to diagnose the disease”); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther 
Tuebner, Regime-Collisions:  The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1001-02 (2004) (discussing “[t]he issue of how to com-
bat” fragmentation, as well as “all the problems of contradictions between individual 
decisions, rule collisions, doctrinal inconsistency and conflict between different legal 
principles . . . increasingly concerning case law, expert committees, ICJ Presidents and 
academic controversies”) (footnotes omitted).  
216 See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 963, 967 (2004) (“An alternate perspective on the increasing number of fora for 
international legal adjudication is that international law is today more relevant than it 
has ever been in the past.”); see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 10 
(2004) (“[W]e need global rules without centralized power but with government actors 
who can be held to account through a variety of political mechanisms . . . . [A] world 
order based on government networks, working alongside and even in place of more 
traditional international institutions, holds great potential.”); Raustiala, supra note 104, at 
3-4 (arguing that contemporary international cooperation “is not inter-national at all” but 
is in fact occurring at the state level and that the laws made at that level between cooperat-
ing domestic agencies “have growing international salience” in a “globalizing world”). 
217 Burke-White, supra note 216, at 971.  
218 Raustiala, supra note 104, at 7.  
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role in inter-State relations.”219  Fragmentation creates the possibility, 
and in many cases the reality, of conflicting judicial decisions based on 
similar or the same law.220  Because international law lacks a hierar-
chical court system, there is no mechanism to resolve these conflicts.  
Moreover, multiple overlapping international institutions create the 
possibility of inconsistent treaty-based obligations and forum shop-
ping.221  These overlapping obligations can reduce international law’s 
effectiveness by rendering international legal obligations unclear or 
making it difficult to comply with all of the obligations governing a 
single activity.  The availability of forum shopping, and indeed frag-
mentation itself, as litigation strategies can also raise the transaction 
costs for states that want to change international legal rules.222  Of par-
ticular note, Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs argue that fragmenta-
tion prevents logrolling—exchanging votes across unrelated issue 
areas—and coalition building by weaker states.223  Weak states cannot 
logroll because fragmentation means that rules in different issue areas 
are being worked out in isolation.224  In this respect, forum shopping 
inhibits learning.  Powerful states remain in one forum until weak 
 
219 Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?  Postmodern 
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 555 (2002) (quoting H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, 
President, Int’l Court of Justice, Speech to the Gen. Assembly of the United Nations 
(Oct. 30, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php? 
pr=82&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Benven-
isti & Downs, supra note 104, at 625 (discussing how fragmentation can be used a strat-
egy by powerful states to effectively disenfranchise weak states). 
220 See Caroline Henkels, Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO-FTA Nexus:  
A Potential Approach for the WTO, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 571, 574 (2008) (explaining that 
jurisdictional overlap and the rise in adjudicative fora with compulsory jurisdiction 
increases the risk of conflicting decisions and fragmentation). 
221 See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 104, at 630 (“Any serious effort on the part 
of international tribunals to define the nature of these . . . obligations . . . will inevitably 
bring [them] into conflict with the fragmentation strategies of powerful states . . . .”); 
Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L 
ORG. 277, 299 (2004) (arguing that actors, when given the choice of any of a multitude 
of fora for developing international rules, will select a forum that is best suited to their 
interests).  
222 See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 104, at 599 (outlining four separate “frag-
mentation strategies” and noting the corresponding increase in transaction costs for 
weaker states). 
223 Id. at 610. 
224 See id. (“This proliferation of narrow agreements with few, if any, linkages makes 
logrolling among weaker states and cooperation virtually impossible.”). 
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states begin to gain control of the forum; the powerful then decamp to 
another forum to conduct negotiations.225 
I make a third argument.  Fragmentation can result from a race to 
capture customary rules through codification.  The fragmentation of 
codified custom undermines customary law as a whole by removing 
any pretense of a unified customary law binding on all nations.  Divi-
sions over how to interpret and apply customary rules become en-
shrined in treaties that have little hope of becoming universal.226  
Moreover, the fact that the divisions have now been codified signifi-
cantly increases the cost of future coordination.  Instead of bringing 
other states along one at a time, states that have codified a competing 
version of custom face higher costs if they abandon their treaty in fa-
vor of another codifying agreement.  Below, I describe how codifica-
tion can lead to fragmentation and then explain the difficulties of 
fragmented but codified customary law. 
1.  How Codification Leads to Fragmentation 
Codification can lead to fragmentation in at least two ways.  First, 
fragmentation can result from a straightforward failure to coordinate 
on the same interpretation of customary law, even when coordination 
is in each group’s interest.  If different groups of states simultaneously 
attempt to codify their own preferred versions of a customary rule, 
then they may end up codifying different versions of the rule.  This 
inefficient outcome occurs when states prefer cooperation, but distri-
butional tension exists over what standard states that would like to co-
operate should adopt.227  Each group of states codifies its preferred 
version, even when both groups would prefer a single interpretation of 
the customary rule to two different ones.  
In the real world, this outcome is unlikely. Codification does not 
happen instantaneously.  It takes time, and information about ongoing 
 
225 See id. at 614 (maintaining that powerful states commonly switch to a competing 
venue when weaker states gain control); see also Cohen, supra note 215 (manuscript at 
36-39) (arguing that fragmentation is not only a result of doctrinal inconsistencies, 
however strategic, but that it also stems from fundamental disagreements about legiti-
mate means of international lawmaking).  
226 Cf. Cohen, supra note 215 (manuscript at 18-19) (arguing that interpretative 
disputes often mask deeper disputes over the legitimacy of international lawmaking 
procedures).  
227 This structure resembles the anachronistically labeled game known as the “Bat-
tle of the Sexes,” in which players prefer to coordinate their activities but can fail to do 
so because of distributional tensions over which outcome to coordinate to achieve. 
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codification efforts among states is relatively good.  Thus, a first-mover 
can establish a focal point with an initial codification and thereby re-
duce unintended fragmentation. 
Early codification efforts following decolonization likely benefitted 
from this type of first-mover advantage.  Newly independent states did 
not pursue separate codification efforts because they either did not 
realize the effects of codification or did not develop a firm view on 
what customary rules favored their interests.228  Once the VCDR or the 
VCLT codified interpretations of those two laws, states preferring co-
ordination had little choice but to adhere to those conventions.229  A 
separate codification no longer had the chance to attract support, 
making it less desirable than simply coordinating on existing rules.  
The second way in which codification can lead to fragmentation—
and the more prevalent in my view—is when two groups of states in 
sharp distributional conflict over the content of legal rules each group 
tries to use codification as a means to capture the customary rules.  
The intuition is that the codification of custom can have a polarizing 
effect, similar to that of political parties on domestic politics, thereby 
stymieing the will of the median voter (or state, in this case).230  This 
situation differs from a mere failure to coordinate because the two 
groups do not necessarily prefer cooperation with each other.  Rather, 
codification is part of a strategy that each group of states employs to 
lock in its preferred rules and attract states that might otherwise resist.  
However, if two groups of states employ this strategy simultaneously, 
they can prevent a single uniform understanding of a rule from 
emerging.  
To illustrate how this dynamic can lead to fragmentation, suppose 
two groups of states that are each considering codifying an area of cus-
tomary law.  Each group (or individual state within a group) would 
like the codified rule to maximize its own utility.  A single codifying 
 
228 See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449, 510 & n.254, 511 (2000) (detailing the “curious era” in which new states adopted 
the minimum customary standards of the once-controlling Western nations). 
229 See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 
YALE L.J. 202, 230-31 (2010) (arguing that Western countries developed the theory that 
one could not withdraw from customary international law during decolonization to 
ensure that customary international law developed by Western states would continue to 
bind new states).  
230 The median voter model is a theoretical model of voting in which the median 
member of a group determines the group’s policy choices.  See generally Duncan Black, 
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948) (articulating and 
outlining the original rationale behind the theorem). 
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state’s utility is a product of two factors:  how close the codified rule is 
to its preferred rule, and how many states (and also which states) are 
expected to adhere to the codified rule.  These factors reflect the fact 
that, as discussed above, codifying states face a tradeoff between admit-
ting more states to the codification effort and codifying their preferred 
rule.  Having more states cooperate on the codification effort not only 
translates into more pull for the codified rule among noncodifying 
states, but it also likely leads to a weakening or generalizing of the cod-
ified rule.231  An individual state would only willingly move away from 
its preferred rule if the reduction in utility was offset by the utility 
gained from additional adherents. 
This tradeoff has significant implications for codification efforts.  
Groups of states with sharply divergent views of the ideal version of a 
customary rule are unlikely to moderate their ideal to attract states 
on the opposite extreme.  When states’ ideal points are too far apart, 
attracting states with diametrically opposed views involves giving up 
too much value in terms of the rules of cooperation, even factoring in 
benefits from additional adherents.  Codifying states with extreme 
views are thus unlikely to be interested in expending significant effort 
to attract other states with which they have a sharp distributional con-
flict.  Rather, the tradeoff between the rule and the number of ex-
pected adherents is likely to cause codifying states to focus on 
moderate states. 
This dynamic might at first blush seem good for cooperation.  The 
median voter theory suggests that where extreme groups compete for 
the support of moderates, proposed rules should collapse to the pro-
posal the median voter favors.232  Codification should therefore have a 
unifying effect.  Unfortunately, as experience with domestic politics 
shows, intermediate institutions can interfere with this result.233  An 
intermediate institution, as I use the term here, refers to an institution 
that makes a rule or policy choice that binds only its participants but 
acts as a proposal to the general population.  Political parties and 
chambers of Congress are intermediate institutions in this sense.  In 
nominating a candidate, for example, a party selects its representative 
in the general election, but that selection is merely a proposal to the 
 
231 See supra Section III.D.  
232 Jesse Richman, Parties, Pivots, and Policy:  The Status Quo Test, 105 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 151, 152 (2011). 
233 See id. at 152-53 (describing several theories under which institutional veto play-
ers and political parties can alter the median voter result).  
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general population.  Intermediate institutions tend to force proposals to 
the median of participants in the institution.  Where those participants 
are not representative of the general population, intermediate institu-
tions can have a polarizing effect.  Put differently, where the median 
member of an intermediate institution differs from the median mem-
ber of the general population, the intermediate institution can pre-
vent policy choices from collapsing on the general population’s 
median.  Thus, the median member of Congress may be rendered im-
potent because he is far from the median member of his respective 
chamber, and it is the median member of the chamber who controls 
that chamber’s policy position. 
A codifying treaty is an intermediate institution in the sense I use 
the term here.  The treaty establishes a rule binding on its parties, but 
the codified interpretation of the customary rule is really a proposal to 
noncodifying states to adopt a rule as custom.  The tradeoff between 
moving away from a preferred rule and attracting adherents will de-
termine how close to the center codifying states are willing to move.  
Codifying states with outlying preferences will resist changing the codi-
fied rule if attracting moderates is too costly.  This resistance creates 
space for an alternative codification effort in the other extreme.  Two 
(or more) different codification efforts ultimately raise the cost of 
reconciling states to a single, unified understanding of customary law. 
In this way, codification can entrench differences.  Two groups of 
states frame their preferred rule in an effort to attract moderate states.  
The very purpose of codification is, as set forth above, to negotiate a 
rule without including those who would dilute the rule.  But resistance 
to dilution and inclusion results in an interpretation of a customary 
rule that cannot gain universal acceptance.  Moreover, once there are 
two or more different codifications of the same rule, achieving a uni-
versal interpretation of the rule becomes even harder than it was prior 
to codification.  Codifying states can no longer adopt a new interpreta-
tion of the customary rule without cost.  Instead, they incur either the 
political and legal costs of exiting or violating the codifying treaty or the 
costs of persuading other treaty parties to amend the rule.  Either way, 
these costs inhibit the creation of a unified understanding of custom. 
2.  International Investment Law as  
Fragmented Codification 
The evolution of international investment law illustrates how 
fragmented codifications can impede the development of a truly uni-
versal understanding of customary rules.  Below, I discuss two aspects 
Meyer FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/12/2012 4:36 PM 
1058 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 995 
of the codification of international investment law.  First, I address the 
codification of the Calvo doctrine in the 1970s, particularly by Latin 
American states, and the role it played in inhibiting the development 
of modern investment law.  Second, I analyze how the codification of 
investment law in BITs and regional international investment agree-
ments (IIAs) has prevented a multilateral investment framework from 
emerging.  Investment law has evolved from primarily customary law 
prior to the 1960s to an area dominated by BITs.234  I argue that the 
fragmented codification of international investment law is a key, and 
underappreciated, reason that states have been unable to agree on a 
truly multilateral set of investment rules.  
The failure to reach a multilateral investment agreement, despite 
repeated efforts, is puzzling for a number of reasons.  Unlike interna-
tional trade in goods and services, which was only lightly regulated on 
a multilateral basis prior to the various GATT/WTO agreements, in-
ternational investment law has an extensive background of multilateral 
customary law on which to draw in a multilateral codification effort.  
Moreover, states appear willing and able to reach agreements codify-
ing international investment law in BITs.  The convergence among 
BITs has led some commentators to observe that BITs themselves 
might properly be termed a multilateral regime, even if they are not 
multilateral in form.235  Why, then, have states failed to reach a sub-
stantially similar multilateral agreement?   
Prior work on BITs has suggested that, in bilateral negotiations, 
developing states may compete with each other by establishing legal 
rules designed to attract capital.236  Developing states resist strong in-
vestment rules in multilateral settings because their strength in num-
bers allows them to hold out for more favorable terms.237  By contrast, 
bilateral settings isolate developing states and render them unable to 
 
234 See Jonathan B. Potts, Note, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties:  Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1006 
(2011) (noting that the United States is a party to 40 BITs and that approximately 2600 
exist worldwide).  
235 See SCHILL, supra note 2, at 24 (asserting that BITs may serve the same goals as 
multilateral investment agreements).  
236 See Elkins et al., supra note 114, at 277 (noting that countries which historically 
have been viewed as having unreliable investment environments now compete to estab-
lish BITs favorable to foreign investment).  
237 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 109, at 679 (discussing the different incentives de-
veloping countries face when considering signing a BIT or a multilateral agreement).  
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engage in logrolling, issue linkages, or any of the other tactics that 
contribute to their success in multilateral environments.238   
While some empirical evidence suggests that this competitive dy-
namic may indeed have driven the diffusion of BITs,239 this story can-
not fully explain the failure to coalesce around a single multilateral 
investment agreement.  Developed states have tried several times to 
reach a multilateral agreement on investment among themselves at 
the OECD that would be open for accession—but not renegotiation—
by developing countries.240  Accession to such an exclusively negotiated 
multilateral agreement would have sent the same signal about the fu-
ture treatment of foreign direct investment as signing a series of BITs, 
and developing states would still have been unable to use their 
strength in numbers to obtain favorable terms.  Despite this, a multi-
lateral agreement on investment has never even been opened for sig-
nature.241  I argue that conflicting codification efforts, such as the 
codification of the Calvo doctrine and the variations in substantive 
protections afforded by BITs, enhance our understanding of the ob-
stacles to concluding a multilateral agreement on trade in capital. 
a.  The Codification of the Calvo Doctrine 
International investment law is primarily a descendant of interna-
tional rules governing the treatment of aliens.242  In its origins, it re-
quired that states treat aliens as well as they treat their own nationals—
the so-called national-treatment obligation.243  Over time, developed 
states claimed that an international minimum standard of treatment 
complemented the national-treatment obligation.244  That standard 
established a floor for treatment of aliens, even if such poor treatment 
was consistent with a state’s behavior toward its own nationals.245  Many 
 
238 See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 104, at 610 (suggesting that developed coun-
tries often use narrow agreements to divide weaker states and hamper their ability to 
negotiate).  
239 See generally Elkins et al., supra note 114.  
240 See SCHILL, supra note 2, at 53 (noting that moving negotiations to the OECD 
was part of a strategy to exclude developing states from negotiations). 
241 See id. at 31-60 (describing various failed multilateral efforts to negotiate an 
agreement on investment). 
242 See id. at 25-28 (explaining the history of modern informational rules about al-
iens and their relationship to international investment law).  
243 Id.  
244 Id. 
245 Id.  
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arbitral tribunals have held that the exact content of the international 
minimum standard evolves over time.  At one time, the standard might 
have aligned with the tribunal’s decision in Neer v. Mexico—that only 
outrage, bad faith, or willful neglect toward an alien violated the in-
ternational minimum standards.246  However, in recent years, tribu-
nals—although not without exception247—have expressly rejected that 
standard in favor of standards based on more modern concepts of fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.248  This mod-
ern view includes rules requiring that expropriation be for a public 
purpose, nondiscriminatory, in accordance with due process, and ac-
companied by the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation (the so-called Hull Rule).249 
The developing world has contested the existence of the interna-
tional minimum standard for decades.250  As noted above in Section 
III.A, the Hull Rule itself comes not from a judicial decision but from a 
diplomatic note sent by the United States to Mexico in the midst of a 
dispute over the Mexican expropriation of American-owned oil fields 
and agrarian lands.251  Mexican resistance to the Hull Rule was part of 
a larger opposition by both Latin American and Eastern Bloc countries 
to the idea that customary international law required more than na-
tional treatment.252  The Calvo doctrine embodied this resistance to 
developed countries’ claims about custom.  This doctrine held that 
foreign investors were entitled only to national treatment, both in 
terms of their substantive legal rights and in terms of their ability to 
seek remedies at international tribunals.253   
 
246 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1926) 
247 See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 21 (NAFTA UNCITRAL 
Arb. Trib. 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Glamis_Award.pdf (holding that the 
standard for fair and equitable treatment had not changed since Neer). 
248 See VANDEVELDE, supra note 175, at 226-32 (discussing how the international 
minimum standard has evolved over the course of a series of NAFTA arbitration cases). 
249 Id. 
250 See SCHILL, supra note 2, at 27 (noting that a movement ot challenge the exist-
ence of an international minimum standard started after World War I). 
251 See id. at 26-27 (noting that the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Cordell Hull, 
articulated an early version of the international minimal standard when he denied 
Mexico’s right to treat American citizens on par with Mexican nationals in a series of 
diplomatic notes).  
252 See id. at 27 (asserting that the Latin American countries’ movement “gained 
ground due to the successful communist revolution in Russia in 1917”).  
253 Shan, supra note 115, at 126. 
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This resistance to the developed world’s assertions about custom-
ary investment law manifested itself in several different types of codifi-
cation efforts.  First, developing states used their numerical superiority 
in the U.N. General Assembly to pass a series of resolutions aimed at 
undermining the international minimum standard.  Two resolutions 
are the most significant in this regard.  Resolution 3201, the NIEO, 
asserted a country’s “right to nationalization or transfer of ownership 
to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent 
sovereignty of the State.”254  The resolution made no reference to a 
responsibility to pay compensation in the event of nationalization.255  
This push to disrupt existing customary law received a further shot in 
the arm with the passage of Resolution 3281, the so-called Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States.256  The Charter adopted the 
Calvo doctrine, stating the right “[t]o nationalize, expropriate or 
transfer ownership of foreign property” was subject only to a duty to 
pay “appropriate compensation . . . , taking into account [a State’s] 
relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State con-
siders pertinent.”257 
To be sure, U.N. General Assembly resolutions are not legally 
binding.  But these resolutions, representing as they do the views of a 
significant majority of states, can reasonably be thought of as soft law.  
That is, while not themselves legally binding, they have legal conse-
quences because states use them to interpret, or correlate with, legal 
obligations.258  In this case, of course, the legal obligations at issue are 
the customary rules of international investment law.  And while there 
is some dispute as to whether the General Assembly resolutions did 
indeed disrupt the international minimum standard,259 that debate 
itself is evidence that the soft codification of the Calvo doctrine in-
creased uncertainty as to what customary law required. 
 
254 G.A. Res. 3201, supra note 157. 
255 Id. 
256 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974). 
257 Id. art. 2.2(c). 
258 See Meyer, supra note 103, at 906 (defining soft law as “those agreements that are 
not themselves legally binding but are created with the expectation that they will be given 
the force of law through either domestic law or binding international agreements”). 
259 Compare Alvarez, supra note 112, at 39-40 (arguing that the NIEO failed to dis-
rupt existing customary rules of international law), with Guzman, supra note 109, at 651 
(arguing that the NIEO demonstrated that certain customary rules of international law, 
such as the Hull Rule, no longer applied).  
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A more important codification, and one that has largely been over-
looked in the literature on the rise of BITs, was the decision by several 
Latin American countries to bind themselves to the Calvo doctrine 
through the Andean Pact.  Specifically, Decision 24 of the Andean 
Commission, the so-called Andean Foreign Investment Code, forbade 
member states from “grant[ing] to foreign investors any treatment 
more favorable than that granted to national investors.”260  Moreover, 
the Code specifically required that member states not enter into any 
“instrument relating to investments . . . that removes possible conflicts 
or controversies from the national jurisdiction.”261  Thus, Andean states 
codified both aspects of the Calvo doctrine—the substantive limitation 
of customary international law to national treatment and the refusal to 
allow international tribunals to take jurisdiction over disputes. 
The Andean Commission’s codification of the Calvo doctrine ap-
pears to have deterred the growth of BITs among Andean Pact coun-
tries.  Indeed, members of the Andean Pact entered into only a single 
BIT from the time Decision 24 came into force until the partial repeal 
of its Calvo provisions in 1987.262  Morever, Andean Pact states signed 
only one additional BIT before the total repeal of the Calvo provisions 
of the Andean Code in Decision 291 of 1991.263  This is despite the fact 
that, according to U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 385 
BITs existed by the end of 1989.264  The five countries in the Andean 
Community thus accounted for only one of those 385 during the period 
in which Decision 24 forbade acceptance and codification of the in-
ternational minimum standard.  By contrast, other Latin American 
states not bound by the Andean Code began entering into BITs con-
siderably earlier.  Panama, for example, had four BITs in force before 
 
260 Andean Commission, Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of 
Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, Decision 24 art. 50, Nov. 30, 1976, 16 
I.L.M. 138, 153.  
261 Id.  
262 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment Treaties 
1959–1999, at 25-123, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at http:// 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf (listing all BITs that countries entered into 
between 1959 and 1999, including those to which Andean Pact nations were parties). 
263 The members of the Andean Pact during this period were Bolivia, Colombia, Ec-
uador, Peru, and Venezuela.  The two exceptions were Ecuador’s BIT with Uruguay and 
Bolivia’s BIT with Germany, which both came into force in November 1990.  Id. at 33, 
48.  Bolivia signed several other BITs during the period between Decision 220 and Deci-
sion 291 (i.e., between the partial and total repeal of the codification of the Calvo doc-
trine), but none of the other BITs came into force until after Decision 291.  See id. at 33. 
264 Id. at iii. 
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Decision 291,265 Uruguay had two,266 and Paraguay had one.267  Thus, 
while the explosion of BITs in the 1990s had many economic and po-
litical causes, it seems reasonable to infer that at least part of the hesi-
tation members of the Andean Pact felt toward BITs stemmed from 
the codification of the Calvo doctrine in Decision 24. 
b.  International Investment Agreements and the Failure to Reach a Multilateral 
Investment Agreement 
Perhaps not coincidentally, the codification of the Calvo doctrine, 
particularly in Latin America, and the pressure that such codification 
put on customary international law as understood by developed states 
led these states to embark on their own codification efforts to shore up 
the existence and content of the international minimum standard.  As 
is well known, developed states’ codification efforts took the form of 
BITs, regional agreements such as NAFTA, and sectoral agreements 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty.268  Many commentators now believe 
that this system of IIAs has created a type of multilateral investment 
law.269  Yet this codification effort displays the attributes of fragmented 
codification.  While IIAs exhibit broad structural convergence, they tend 
to differ in the details, thereby enshrining variations in approaches to 
customary law.  For example, in its Model BIT, the United States and its 
counterparties confirm that the fair and equitable treatment (FET) ob-
ligation is part of the international minimum standard.270  Many other 
BITs, however, imply no connection between the FET standard and the 
international minimum standard, leading many commentators to argue 
that the FET obligation is purely a treaty obligation.271   
 
265 Id. at 89. 
266 Id. at 118-19. 
267 Id. at 90. 
268 See SCHILL, supra note 2, at 42-43 (“Overall, the provisions of many of the re-
gional and sectoral investment treaties closely resemble the standard content of 
BITs . . . .”). 
269 See id. at 24 (arguing that BITs are simply “functional substitute[s]” for a multi-
lateral scheme); Lowenfeld, supra note 6, at 128 (arguing that the existence of a large 
number of similar BITs is effectively “international legislation”). 
270 See 2004 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 40, at 7 (“Each party shall accord to cov-
ered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”).    
271 See, e.g., Marek Wierzbowski & Aleksander Gubrynowicz, Conflict of Norms Stem-
ming from Intra-EU BITs and EU Legal Obligations:  Some Remarks on Possible Solutions (argu-
ing that it would be difficult to get states to agree that FET is part of the international 
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Codifications of the concept of “indirect expropriation” have simi-
larly varied.  In 2004, the United States and Canada added annexes to 
their Model BITs to clarify the standard used in determining whether 
an indirect expropriation has occurred.272  The annex to the United 
States’ Model BIT asserts that “[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and ap-
plied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expro-
priations.”273  This formulation attempts to strike a balance between 
customary international law concepts of police powers and indirect 
expropriation.  This balance protects state police powers while still 
allowing for the possibility that nondiscriminatory regulatory action 
might amount to an indirect expropriation.  India, Singapore, and 
China have included similar codifications in various IIAs.274  Other 
states, however, have sought to omit the qualifier “except in rare cir-
cumstances” and codify a balance between these two customary con-
cepts that is even more protective of state police powers.  For example, 
the 2007 COMESA Common Investment Agreement among Southern 
and Eastern African countries provides, 
Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary interna-
tional law principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory measures tak-
en by a Member State that are designed and applied to protect or en-
enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety 
and the environment, shall not constitute an indirect expropriation under 
this Article.275 
 
minimum standard), in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 544, 
549 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009). 
272 See 2004 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 40, at 38; 2004 CANADA MODEL FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION AGREEMENT, annex B, art. 13(1), available 
at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ 
2004-fipa-model-en.pdf. 
273 2004 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 40, at 38.  
274 See Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International 
Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1051 (2010) (noting that a 2005 free 
trade agreement between India and Singapore and a 2006 BIT between China and 
India incorporated interpretative statements similar to those adopted in 2004 in the 
United States and Canada’s model BITs).  
275 Common Mkt. for E. and S. Africa (COMESA), Investment Agreement for the 
COMESA Common Investment Area art. 20(8), May 23, 2007 available at 
http://vi.unctad.org/files/wksp/iiawksp08/docs/wednesday/ExerciseMaterials/invagr
eecomesa.pdf. 
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The 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement is also abso-
lutist in protecting state police powers.276   
Reconciling the differences between the various standards codified 
in IIAs has become an obstacle to the development of a truly multilat-
eral investment agreement.  Having committed themselves to more 
favorable rules, both developed and developing states have been un-
willing to make the kinds of concessions necessary to reach a multilat-
eral agreement.  Each has preferred its own codified understanding of 
custom to the version that would emerge from a multilateral renegoti-
ation of investment law. 
For example, since the failure of the Havana Charter of the Inter-
national Trade Organization after World War II, efforts at a multilat-
eral investment agreement have shifted between the GATT/WTO and 
the OECD.277  The most serious effort to codify international invest-
ment law at the WTO began when investment was included as one of 
the “Singapore Issues” in 1996.278  The WTO established the Working 
Group on Trade and Investment, but ultimately the topic was so con-
tentious that it was removed from the WTO’s agenda following the 
2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference.279  In large part, the WTO’s ef-
forts fell apart because certain developed and developing countries 
failed to support the WTO rules.280  In particular, the United States felt 
that the results of the WTO negotiations would undermine rules it had 
 
276 See Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement annex 2, Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.asean.org/documents/ 
FINAL-SIGNED-ACIA.pdf (“Nondiscriminatory measures of a Member State that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute an expropriation . . . .”); see also 
Spears, supra note 274, at 1052 (noting that the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement takes the same absolutist approach as the 2007 COMESA Common Invest-
ment Area Agreement).  
277 The effort to include investment in the Havana Charter was largely driven by the 
United States, which ultimately declined to ratify the Charter because the protections 
contained therein were too favorable to capital-importing states.  See SCHILL, supra note 
2, at 33. 
278 See id. at 58-60 (recounting the rise and fall of international investment law as a 
main topic in the WTO). 
279 See Pierre Sauvé, Multilateral Rules on Investment:  Is Forward Movement Possible?, 9 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 325, 330-31 (2006) (acknowledging the impasse that developed be-
tween countries that supported investment negotiations in the WTO and those that 
opposed them).   
280 See Blum, supra note 159, at 341-42 (arguing that defeating a multilateral agree-
ment on investment at the WTO may have been a “Pyrrhic victory” for poorer countries 
left to negotiate BITs with more powerful states).   
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successfully codified through its BIT program.281  Developing countries 
such as India, China, Brazil, and Malaysia also opposed a WTO agree-
ment on investment.282  At least one commentator has explicitly linked 
this resistance to a fear of a multilateral codification of developed 
states’ interpretation of rules on expropriation and compensation.283  
Efforts to codify at the WTO ultimately failed because the negotiations 
required concessions that neither developed nor developing states were 
willing to make in light of their bilateral codification practices.  In other 
words, preexisting codifications inhibited multilateral agreement.  
The OECD’s most recent effort to codify investment law, the 1998 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), failed for similar rea-
sons.  The 1998 MAI faced resistance from a number of quarters.  De-
veloping states, such as India, continued to oppose multilateral rules; 
their objections were based in part on substantive grounds and in part 
due to the exclusive forum in which the rules were being negotiated.284  
On the other side, business interests in developed states were opposed 
to the MAI because protections in BITs struck a more advantageous 
balance between substance and adherence than the MAI.285  Negotia-
tors were also unable to agree on the relationship between the MAI 
and existing IIAs.286  The need for clarification arose not only because 
of the existence of so many prior agreements covering the same sub-
ject matter, but also because both the MAI and existing IIAs either 
 
281 See Sauvé, supra note 279, at 330 (indicating that the business community in the 
United States was concerned that a low-standard WTO agreement might lower the high 
standards of investment protection in U.S. BITs).  
282 Id. at 331.  Brazil, for its part, has signed 15 BITs but has not brought a single 
one into force.  See ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, http://icsid. 
worldbank.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Search Listings of Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties” hyperlink; then follow “Brazil (15)” hyperlink) (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2012).  
283 George Chifor, Caveat Emptor:  Developing International Disciplines for Deterring Third 
Party Investment in Unlawfully Expropriated Property, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 179, 271 
n.326 (2002).  
284 See SCHILL, supra note 2, at 55 (indicating that India’s opposition to the MAI was 
based, at least in part, on the fact that non-OECD members couldn’t participate in the 
negotiations).  
285 See Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited 
(arguing that the failure of the MAI was partially attributable to a “lack of support 
from industry who found that . . . existing BITs provided better protection”), in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 119, 127 (Peter Muchlinski 
et al. eds., 2008).   
286 See id. (asserting that one of the reasons for the MAI’s failure was the “lack of 
clarity as regards the relationship between the MAI, BITs, and the GATS and TRIMs 
Agreements”). 
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purported to or could reasonably be thought to codify custom.  In the 
event of a conflict between treaties, rules on later-in-time treaties pre-
vailing over earlier treaties could settle the dispute.  But since the treaty 
rules in question were related to customary rules, it became even more 
important to identify the relationship of the MAI to the customary law 
as codified in existing IIAs.  Indeed both the commentary to the draft 
MAI287 and a Chairman’s Note288 identify just this issue.  The commen-
tary to the draft MAI points out that “[r]eference to international law 
is critical in [the articles on investment protection],” noting that the 
issue needed to be discussed throughout the MAI.289  Despite this con-
cern, however, the draft MAI failed to include a clause specifying pre-
cisely how it related to existing IIAs.290   
Similar conflict issues have arisen as the European Union has 
moved toward integrating its investment policies.  Specifically, during 
the accession or candidacy of eight Central and Eastern European 
states to the EU, the European Commission determined that a num-
ber of those countries’ BITs were inconsistent with EU law.291  These 
states’ accession to the EU was held up while they renegotiated their 
BITs with the United States.292  Despite this renegotiation, commenta-
tors remain concerned that the potential for conflict is considerably 
greater.293  European states have BITs with many countries other than 
the United States,294 and there are also intra-EU BITs that may conflict 
 
287 OECD, Negotiationg Grp. on the Multilateral Agreement on Inv., The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment:  Commentary to the Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1 
(Apr. 22, 1998), available at http://www1.oecd.org/af/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf. 
288 OECD, The MAI and Bilateral, Regional and Sectoral Agreements, Note by the Chair-
man, DAFFE/MAI(96)26 (Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/ 
pdf/ng/ng9626e.pdf.  
289 OECD, supra note 287, at 29. 
290 See Draft MAI, supra note 10, § X (using language that clarifies the relationship 
only between the draft MAI and the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund).  
291 See Anca Radu, Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’?  Interactions Be-
tween Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 14 EUR. L.J. 237, 241 (2008) (“The Com-
mission . . . found that a number of provisions in the BITs concluded by eight [Central 
and Eastern European] countries with the USA and Canada were inconsistent with the 
EU law and had to be renegotiated.”).  
292 See id. (noting that the renegotiation of a BIT already in force is not an easy task 
and that the Commission had to assist the eight countries with the renegotiation process).  
293 See id. (“The eventual incompatibilities between Member States’ obligations un-
der the BITs and EU law may lead to disputes . . . .”). 
294 Id.  
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with European law and inhibit the ability of the EU to develop its 
competencies in areas related to investment.295 
Investment law thus highlights the costs that codification can im-
pose on attempts to create unified law.  In many decentralized systems 
of law, rhetoric about the benefits of legal pluralism and competition 
among rulemakers appeals to the notion of a market for legal rules.  
But legal institutions are often path dependent and competitive in a 
way that can deprive decentralized legal systems of harmonization 
benefits at the appropriate time.  Despite the existence of the ILC, no 
state or institution has a monopoly on codification.  Codification can 
therefore increase the costs of competition over legal rules by reduc-
ing the future expected benefits from harmonization.  
C.  Conclusion 
The virtue of codification as a strategy to capture legal rules is that 
the costs that codifying states incur in deviating from the rule when 
they deal with noncodifying states increases the pressure on noncodify-
ing states to adhere to the codified customary rules.  Unfortunately, 
these same costs can cut the other way.  Costly commitments to partic-
ular interpretations of customary rules can make unifying the law 
more difficult if multiple codified interpretations of customary rules 
arise.  And this is a likely eventuality.  States with outlying preferences 
will not moderate the codified rules to attract states with very different 
preferences, creating the possibility of competing codifications.  
Thus, codification can, perversely, lead to customary law that is even 
weaker than uncodified custom.  Finally, codifying custom can lead to 
suboptimal rules when powerful states are able to codify changes in 
the law that are Pareto inferior to the status quo.  
CONCLUSION 
The codification of customary international law has been one of 
the central projects of the international legal community since the be-
ginning of the twentieth century.  The drive for codification is part of 
a larger story about global governance increasing the welfare of states.  
The twentieth century, and in particular the post–World War II era, 
 
295 See, e.g., Wierzbowski & Gubrynowicz, supra note 271, at 549 (acknowledging 
that the lack of a clear stance by the EU on the FET clause means there is a possibility 
that investors could use the clause in intra-EU BITs to challenge domestic measures 
that are necessary to meet obligations under EU law).  
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saw the rise of the multilateral treaty as the primary legal instrument in 
an international order that increasingly funneled international dis-
putes into organizational channels.  Codification seemed perfect for 
this enterprise, allowing states to translate large fields of amorphous 
customary law into written instruments that were both purportedly 
clearer and included compliance-inducing mechanisms to increase 
adherence to international law.  Moreover, codification, employing 
the rules of state consent, appeared to address a central concern with 
customary international law—that states can be bound without their 
consent, and thereby made worse off.  
But lawmaking is rarely without distributional consequences.  Le-
gal systems that erect high barriers to the creation of new legal obliga-
tions face pressure to devise processes that reduce the cost of making 
new rules.  The negotiated elaboration of vague, universally applicable 
customary rules is one way in which states seek to reduce the transac-
tion costs of making new law.  Codification does this by limiting partic-
ipation in the formulation of customary rules and, at the same time, 
creating incentives for excluded states to adhere to the negotiated 
terms.  The consequences of this strategy of codification are profound.  
Codified customary rules, counterintuitively, may not evolve toward 
efficiency, thus casting further doubt on the thesis that decentralized 
systems of law offer a way out of the gridlock and messy politics that 
plague legislatures and legislative-like bodies.  Moreover, codification 
can actually undercut the long-term benefits of competition among 
legal rules by making it more difficult to harmonize standards.  
These consequences should lead us to question the desirability of 
codification as an across-the-board solution to the indeterminacy that 
can plague international legal obligations.  In some instances, bare 
customary law may be superior in delivering on the promises of a uni-
versal and decentralized legal system.  Perhaps more importantly, cod-
ification’s distributional consequences highlight the importance of 
reconsidering the status of sacred cows.  If the consent system does not 
protect against inefficient changes in and the fragmentation of cus-
tomary law, then perhaps the consent requirement should be jetti-
soned in favor of a rule that more appropriately balances the 
competing objectives of international lawmakers.  
